

CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

A Summary and critical discussion
of Bavinck's Pedagogical Principles

BY
J. BREDERVELD

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
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
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DR. H. BADINCK

1854 - 1921



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CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

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Discussion of Bavinck's
Pedagogical Principles


by
J. BREDERVELD
LEYDEN, NETHERLANDS

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Translated by
TWO MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY
OF CALVIN COLLEGE
GRAND RAPIDS, - - MICHIGAN

*L.J. FLOKSTRA
G. HARTMAN.*

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P R E F A C E

ALMOST three years ago there appeared a translation of No. 20 of a series of pamphlets published by "Gereformeerd Schoolverband", an organization in The Netherlands promoting Christian Education there. The translation now presented originally appeared as No. 25 of that same series, and was written by Mr. J. Brederveld, a teacher in one of the Christian Schools in Leyden, Holland.

Dr. H. Bavinck, whose pedagogy is being summarized and evaluated in this pamphlet, was one of the leaders in the movement for Christian Education in The Netherlands, and his writings in the field of pedagogy were the main sources used by our pioneers in their struggle for free Christian Schools here. However, with the rapid Americanization in our circles the works of Bavinck in the original are beyond the reach of most of us. Hence the publisher decided to provide something of Bavinck in translation, especially since he had an opportunity of procuring a summary and evaluation of Bavinck's PAEDAGOGISCHE BEGINSELEN. It is his wish and also that of the translators that this publication may renew the study of Bavinck's pedagogy by all interested in the cause of Christian nurture and training.

As in No. 20, the translators have given a faithful rendering of Mr. Brederveld's ideas, though they have at times omitted certain irrelevant parts or bare repetitions, and at other times, where clarification seemed to demand such, added a sentence or two, and throughout have not felt themselves bound to a narrowly literal translation. These considerations, as well as the preparation of a marginal outline, were necessary to develop for the American reader a clearer and more finished product.

THE TRANSLATORS.

Grand Rapids, Michigan.
February, 1928.

~~THE DWARLES O. REISNER~~

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
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CHAPTER ONE

HERMAN BAVINCK AND PEDAGOGY

EVEN a hasty survey of Bavinck's writings reveals three very interesting stages in the development of his scientific* interests. His doctor's thesis is on a subject in the history of dogma; as pastor he confines his study to dogmatical and ethical questions; as professor at Kampen he produces his main work, his *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* in four volumes, and incidentally writes a respectable book, *Begin-selen der Zielkunde*. Though he still does treat many problems in dogmatics, essentially there is no further development of any phase of theology. Philosophical and ethical problems now engage his attention and *Christelijke Wetenschap, Christelijke Wereld en Levensbeschouwing*, later expanded in the form of Stone Lectures and published as *The Philosophy of Revelation*, successively appear. But philosophy as such, like theology in an earlier period, no longer receives his undivided attention, and now in the third stage he devotes himself to pedagogical studies. *Pedagogische Beginselen*

Three stages
in Bavinck's
development

* "Wetenschappelijk" has in this work generally been translated "scientific", though, as the reader will know, the English term "science" and its derivatives are much narrower in meaning than the corresponding terms in Dutch and German.—Tr.

appeared in 1904, *De Opvoeding der Rijpere Jeugd* in 1916, *De Nieuwe Opvoeding* in 1917, and *Bijbelsche en Religieuze Psychologie* in 1920.

* * * * *

Yet the
development
is unitary

A more careful study of all of Bavinck's writings, however, shows that the three stages in his life as author are not merely consecutively but organically related. The stages indicate Bavinck's own inner development. The moment we succeed in tracing this principle of development in Bavinck himself, we shall better understand the nature of his pedagogical writings and their significance for us.

Bavinck's
fundamental
interest an
interest in
man

And what was this inner development in Bavinck? It does not at all consist in saltatory changes but in the gradual growth and ever clearer appearance of that fundamental trait in his career as a student of life and in his whole personality, which can best be described as his concern for man, and which causes him to seek the field of study most congenial to this concern. And this solicitude for man is not first of all for man in his obvious, everyday aspect, the aspect of his daily struggle for natural existence—though he by no means ignores this side—but is especially for man on his ideal side, the side of his desperate struggle for the highest good, of his search, often a blundering one, for the right. Throughout Bavinck's writings one can trace this interest with ever increasing distinctness.

This interest explains his sense for the historical. Hardly a subject did he treat without considering its history from early ages down. Nor does he neglect his contemporaries; he studies them, quotes them, and almost loses himself in their ideas so that the reader is often at a loss to find the boundary between reproduction and criticism.

Hence his
historical
sense

Bavinck's adduction of history is not, as is the case with many, for the purpose of approaching his subject, of stimulating his own thoughts, and of clarifying, complementing, and strengthening them, but is with him evidence of a genuine historical interest for which every bit of human life and struggle has intrinsic value.

There are, of course, other factors to be considered in explaining why Bavinck then did not become a great historian but developed as dogmatician, as philosopher, as teacher of ethics, and as pedagogue.

As was already observed, the centre of Bavinck's interest in man is his struggle for *spiritual goods*, just because these spiritual values were of so much significance to Bavinck himself. He himself is a man among men; what they seek he also desires, and what threatens them also alarms him. In the various movements he seeks the objective, the normative. There is, as he is fond of saying, a realm of ideas, and of it he wishes to be a citizen. He longs to know that which is unchangeable and far beyond all human caprice, that which is

Hence, too,
the objective
is for Bavinck
never
de-humanized

immovable amidst the shifting opinions. But that which is objective is never for Bavinck merely external; it is something which can and must be taken up into his own life. And this is the reason why he is not primarily interested in external nature and the natural sciences, why he inclines rather toward humanism than toward realism, though believing that above both stands Christian pedagogy. For this reason, too, he prefers that interpretation of Kantian philosophy which looks upon it as an investigation into the manner in which man acquires knowledge and morality. For this reason also the actual living struggle of opinions captivates him, so that in spite of his erudition and love for exactness he cares not for abstract theorizing but rather keeps in touch with what is universally human, and has a message for every type and condition of man. Never does he so lose himself in the objective that he becomes indifferent to man in his capacities of knowing and striving.

And hence, in part, his interest in pedagogy,

Bavinck's regard for man, then, explains how he finally reached the realm of pedagogy and explains, too, the nature of his activity in this field. It was but natural for him, interested as he was in man's struggle for spiritual treasures, to analyze various movements which looked for the salvation of humanity in a new and supposedly better type of education.

the other factor being his Reformed convictions

A second factor explaining Bavinck's interest in pedagogy was his own acceptance of Christian faith according to the Reformed confession

—an outlook upon life which he longed to clarify in others and in himself.

As a result of these two strong influences, interest in man and love for the Reformed confession, he readily saw, while studying the pioneers in their practical warfare in matters pertaining to the school,* how theory gradually became the most practical thing in the world, and how theory would be needed especially after the struggle had been won, in order to retain what had been achieved;—theory based on such outstanding principles as would unmistakably contrast with a large number of opinions and phenomena, and which therefore could readily be used as norm to evaluate those hostile notions, condemning their wrong implications and accepting whatever was valuable in them.

The occasion
offered by the
school
situation in
Holland

The need of a critical attitude, together with Bavinck's many-sided interest in human affairs, explains the large amount of polemics and apologetics found also in his pedagogical writings. He, too, was a believer in antitheses—even though he had no preference for them as such. Never did his conviction, that he had at least in principle laid hold on the truth, lead him to a self-complacent boasting of the pre-eminence of his own views; rather he felt himself laid hold on by truth; this and not self-satisfaction impelled him to accept the antithesis and defend

His attitude
regarding the
antithesis
between the
Christian and
the non-
Christian

* The author here has reference to the Dutch School War between the Modernists and the Orthodox, lasting from 1842 to 1922, and resulting in full equality between the state school of the Modernists and the private school of the Orthodox.—Tr.

it. And his insistence on antitheses had all the more effect just because of his ability to appreciate whatever good there was to be found in the convictions of his opponents. Especially did he build on this antithesis in the sphere of pedagogy for reasons bound up with the special difficulties of teachers in the confessional schools. For these difficulties there were two reasons: to secure practical results these teachers often adopted without critical evaluation whatever material from the modernistic writers on pedagogy promised success; and, again, in studying theory of pedagogy these teachers had to use books written from a viewpoint contrary to the principle of the antithesis. Prompted by these considerations, Bavinck is not satisfied with the giving of mere lectures for the Christian teachers but decides to work them out in his *Paedagogische Beginnselen* and to produce more pedagogical writings of this sort.

What to
expect from
Bavinck in
the field of
pedagogy

.....A mere casual reading of Bavinck's first book on pedagogy must soon convince us that the author writes as a pedagogue giving guidance to his followers. He was moved more by the desire of presenting a clear exposition of the many contemporaneous systems of education, of their nature, and of the Christian viewpoint over against them than by a longing for thoroughgoing systematic research.

One should not, therefore, expect from Bavinck a rigid treatment of pedagogy as a science but rather look for a discussion of major pedagogical questions by a thoroughly oriented

and learned man. He it was in our circles who took from pedagogy its professional abstractness and showed us its manifold relations to the whole realm of science; who educated us to consider pedagogy no longer as a sinister subject dreaded in every examination but as a vital part of the great world of spiritual reality; who taught us that pedagogy cannot be learned but should be studied.

Once we catch this view of Bavinck's intentions and of his services, we no longer expect him exhaustively to discuss the field of pedagogy; we seek only assistance and guidance in the study of pedagogy.

And hence our writing about Bavinck's pedagogical works is not intended to be a substitute for Bavinck himself but rather as a stimulus to a more serious study of this leader in Christian pedagogy. To that end no extensive survey of all his pedagogical writings is needed; it is sufficient to trace the principal issues, and these may be found in his *Paedagogische Beginselen*, first published in 1904, a second edition appearing in 1917. After one is familiar with the main principles discussed by him and is able to recognize the outstanding movements opposed by him, he will find that *De Nieuwe Opvoeding* and *De Opvoeding der Rijpere Jeugd* do widen the horizon but offer no new points of view. We shall, then, limit ourselves to a discussion of *Paedagogische Beginselen*.

His
'Paedago-
gische Begin-
selen',
representative

But why write about this book? The aim is not to give an historical account of its origin,

its contents, etc., or to subject it to "criticism", or to determine Bavinck's place in the development of Christian pedagogy. The well-known truth, that only the food one assimilates gives one energy, is also applicable in a spiritual sense. One cannot read Bavinck offhand and mentally bolt down everything he presents. The material needs digestion, and selection is therefore a first requisite. The problems discussed are not of equal importance, and not everything need be remembered. In order that the student may more readily get both a general view of Christian pedagogy and some notion of its structure, we shall give a summary of the book to serve as a preparation for subsequent and necessary discussions. What we wish to assimilate and use must be looked at from all sides, for an all-around view makes a subject live for us. Discussion is here one of the best means for examining the subject and for penetrating it The discussion will, as the title of the book indicates, be critical. But this should not be understood as the result of criticism merely for the sake of criticism; it is an attempt to do justice to a great leader. And so we may perhaps be permitted here to express our sincere appreciation of the work Bavinck has done; an appreciation that is indeed implicitly present throughout the following pages although in them we have tried to confine ourselves impersonally to the material discussed, frankly presenting our own views.

CHAPTER TWO

SUMMARY OF BAVINCK'S "INTRODUCTION"

BAVINCK begins his *Paedagogische Begin-selen* with an "Introduction" in which he discusses three matters: the need of education, the notion or definition of education, and pedagogy as the science of education.

The Need of Education

Education is made necessary by the helplessness that characterizes the infant, and by the fact that a long process still separates the child from mature human existence,—a process requiring guidance.

The need
founded in
infant
helplessness

In plant or animal development, the purpose of the individual is attained by a natural process of growth; human interference with this natural process can produce at best only external changes. Man, on the contrary, like the angels, has a rational and moral nature. But while in the angel this rational and moral nature is present at once and in all its fulness, in the infant it is present only in germ, as a disposition, as something requiring development. This development, in turn, if it is to be successful, cannot be a merely natural process,

Man as
differing from
the animal
and the angel

but requires guidance. And thus man (unlike the angel) needs education and (unlike the animal) has capacity for it.

Inasmuch as man is both body and soul, guiding his development is a two-fold activity: nourishing his body ("voeden") and educating his soul ("opvoeden"). Though each is related to the other, the distinction remains; mere physical care is not enough; for the spiritual well-being of man, care of the soul, that is to say education, is indispensable. Without education the very life of the moral and rational nature of man is jeopardized. The need of education, then, roots in our human nature.

Definition of Education

Education
in the
broader sense

Education when taken in its broadest sense is effected by the environment of the child. Influences of various kinds and from all quarters crowd in on him and contribute to the moulding of him. The process is for the greater part unconscious and unintentional, but by the same token leaves an impression all the deeper. Nature and society form the environment; from them stream forth influences to which the child is subjected; and though, as was said, most of these influences are unpremeditated, without them as general background education in the narrower sense, intentional education, could not exist. All the factors and agents with which creation abounds are means for education; ultimately, then, education understood thus broadly has its origin in God.

"From the adult the immature individual . . . receives guidance and fashioning in order that on reaching maturity he may act his part as a human being in the true sense of the word. This process we call education in the narrower sense." (15)*

Education
in the
stricter sense

And such education requires careful thought;—a truth already applicable to the education intentionally given in the family circle and whose applicability becomes only the more evident as education becomes increasingly the business of the school instead of the family.

All this is not to deny that in actual teaching there exists in the relationship between educator and child something of the immediate, the unreflective, and that this is particularly true within the circle of the family. It is simply to insist that even with parents reflection on the labor they feel themselves called to devote to their children ought not to be absent, and that such is still more true of the professional teacher in the school. The latter's main business is to instruct, and instruction has its own special character, and in this special character lays an additional necessity on the professional teacher to work planfully and reflectively.

Pedagogy as the Science of Education

It is not surprising, therefore, that various thinkers have from earliest times reflected on education. The result has been a science of education, a pedagogy.

* The numbers at the end of quotations refer to the pages in Bavinck's "Paedagogische Beginselen".—Tr.

The
importance of
pedagogy

Admittedly, pedagogy cannot take the place of life itself, nor is it intended as a substitute for tact, nor again is it able to furnish means for getting out of the child more than the child's capacities allow; but withal it is of great importance to the work of educating.

For, first, pedagogy aids that reflection on his work in which every teacher inevitably engages, and enriches the experiences and fundamental theses which, even apart from pedagogy, already guide him in his teaching.

Again, pedagogy affords a clear insight into the task and the aim of education, and teaches us the ways and means along and by which this aim can be attained. It saves the teacher from error and disappointment, from routine and rote.

In the third place, pedagogy enables us with more profound consciousness to engage in one of the most glorious types of activity God has entrusted to human beings. And to live consciously is the privilege and glory of man.

The character
of pedagogy

The importance of the science of education is still more evident when one considers its nature. Pedagogy characteristically concerns itself with the guidance of the human being and with the purpose which this guidance should help him attain. And consequently pedagogy involves the whole of our view of life and the world; its bases are religious, ethical, philosophical, and psychological; otherwise put, it is impossible to construct a pedagogy indifferent

to all the various theories of reality. On the other hand it is equally true that no pedagogy arises through purely theoretical deductions from ultimate principles. Experience and induction are necessary as well if we are to become acquainted with the children who are to be taught; and thus biology, physiology and psychology are indispensable as sciences auxiliary to pedagogy. So, too, because man is placed in society, affected by and himself generating social influences, the sciences of history and sociology can render invaluable service to pedagogy.

Empirical
sciences
necessary

But though the demands of observation and experience are entitled to recognition, such is always subject to the reservation that there exists no pure experience, no "objective" observation, but rather that each individual sees and interprets reality in his own way. And this reservation is especially pertinent in the human world, in society as distinct from nature.

but not
sufficient

"Pedagogy is, therefore, a science of a peculiar type; it does not despise experience and historical fact, but neither is it ever built on these alone. Nor could it be, inasmuch as for pedagogy it is of the greatest importance to know what the origin, the essential nature, and the destiny of man are. But this pedagogically essential knowledge cannot be obtained, certainly not adequately obtained, by empirical or historical means. It is from religion and ethics, from theology and philosophy, that we must learn what we wish to know in this regard." (21)

And as a matter of fact, pedagogy does not itself furnish its own material for study, but

Pedagogy as
science
and as art

borrowed it on the one hand from the disciplines just mentioned, and on the other from physiology, psychology and sociology. This derived material pedagogy organizes, however, according to its own specific purpose: to discover what the principle, the method, and the aim of education ought to be. So far as pedagogy limits itself to this purpose, it is a science; if it goes on to indicate the application of educational theory "it acquires the character of art" (22).

The
fundamental
importance
to pedagogy
of Christianity

If now this characterization of pedagogy is correct, it is self-evident that the Christian religion is of great significance for it. To view things in the light of the Word of God is to view them in their true character. And hence a pedagogy that is Christian will tell us "what man is according to the Word of God, what his destination, and how he can be guided thither" (23).

CHAPTER THREE

DISCUSSION OF THE "INTRODUCTION"

BAVINCK'S "Introduction" affords a preliminary orientation in the field of pedagogy. Various matters are touched upon which he will treat more extensively later. His view of the character of pedagogy as a science is so concisely stated as to be incomplete; though here, too, later pages make some amends. Two or three points which he raises will bear more detailed discussion.

What is Pedagogy?

Pedagogy, according to Bavinck, is the science of education. But in order to get a clearer understanding, it is pertinent here to insist on a distinction.

A variety of opinions and counsels regarding education and its aim has been launched in the course of the ages. All of this we usually lump together as pedagogy. But by no means all of it is science. Part of it consists of all sorts of ideas on education more or less systematically arranged. Take the thoughts on education of Comenius, Rousseau, Pestalozzi or Ellen Key, and you have indeed a number of opinions and suggestions with some attempt at demonstration

Mere opinions
are not yet
science

of their truth, but the method employed is not that of science. Names like those mentioned are names of prophets rather than of teachers of education. The first conscious attempt to lead pedagogy in scientific channels was made by Herbart, whose chief work accordingly carries the title *Pedagogy as a Science*.

What has just been said should not be taken to mean that such less scientific work as of the "prophets" named contains no truth or can be of no value; that it is not the fruit of experience and reflection, or that it can have no scientific significance. On the contrary, just as in every science intuition and even daily experience play their rôles, so in the field of pedagogy especially one cannot deny the possibility that an ingenious suggestion may on occasion be of more direct benefit than the most painfully accurate investigation. The influence which such a "prophetic" pedagogy exerts in wide-spread circles is frequently much greater than that of the carefully weighed but drily abstract conclusions of science. Besides, such pedagogy often grows out of practical life and is able to indicate methods that can be widely adopted and that lead to useful results.

But withal, that does not make science out of such pedagogy. And although in one's quest for a science of pedagogy all such theses and data furnish valuable material, one's method of approach will have to be quite different,—will

indeed have to be that of systematic investigation.

There is then a two-fold pedagogy; pedagogy as opinion and pedagogy as science. True, every science begins with opinion and remains shot through with opinion; true also that the gulf between opinion and science should not be widened arbitrarily; but there remains nevertheless the scientific demand that one seek to arrive at one's conclusions by the right method.

We cannot here discuss the question how far in spite of different creeds we are able in science to approach each other's positions and to agree each with the other. This much at least is evident, that one cannot relegate all differences to the realm of opinion, holding meanwhile that what calls itself science is convincing for everybody. The rôle of principles is important, but one that cannot be delineated in a few words. The fact that though their points of departure differ one scientist can often accept three-fourths of his opponent's results, furnishes food for thought.

Difficult to
state the
place of
differences
in life-view

But we return to a question more directly in the field of the present discussion: whether there actually can be a pedagogy in the second sense; that is to say, whether there can be a pedagogy as science (not as mere opinion).

Is Pedagogy a Science?

Dr. Bavinck accepts an affirmative answer as self-evident. The only qualification he makes

is that when pedagogy translates itself into rules of practical application, it becomes an art, and by "an art" he means, of course, a guide in the art of educating; practical prescriptions never themselves become the art which they serve.

An objection
to calling
pedagogy a
science

The question, however, also admits of and meets with a negative answer. If, for example, one limits science to that which yields results convincing to everybody and expressible in terms of measure and number, then pedagogy is not a science. But then too we can erase a good many others—history, sociology, economics, and a good share of psychology. Indeed, such demands are unwarranted; all that can legitimately be required is a treatment of the material in accord with fundamental scientific principles, remembering that every type of material has its own demands and its own difficulties.

Another
objection

But in the case of pedagogy just with reference to this material itself another objection arises that might impeach the possibility of a science of education. As Bavinck says, pedagogy really borrows its subject-matter from other sciences; is not the necessary consequence that instead of a science we get, then, nothing but a hodge-podge of erudition? Education has a philosophical and a theological aspect—the treatment of this phase, then, would properly belong to philosophy and theology; it has a psychological aspect,—this should be turned over to psychology; and so on; but with such a

procedure, what would become of the unity? One might reply that the unity admittedly requisite for any science is in pedagogy derived from the purpose to afford guidance to the teacher. But excellent as the purpose may be edifyingly and usefully to unite all these matters from other sciences, and true as it may be that no science should be foreign to practical life, the trouble with this reply is that one does not by the road it suggests attain to theoretical, to scientific unity.

In attempting a satisfactory reply, let us look at the matter from another angle. It is, we may at once grant, the nature of science to strive for unity; its objective is all existence as a unified and co-operating plurality. But it is pertinent here to remind ourselves that science does not deny the distinctions, the plurality, within this unity, and that whatever its ultimate theoretical aim, science actually begins in every case with what are only fragments, and finds it necessary to divide its labors, to specialize. Briefly, we should remember that science is not one but many. Anatomy, physiology, psychology, sociology, history,—each, with deliberate intention, throughout considers only one aspect of man; and yet man is admittedly not limited to any one of these aspects but is an individual totality. This scientific process of abstraction, this specialization, this limitation of viewpoint, then, is necessary, but its inadequacy and one-sidedness remain.

Attempt to
defend the
position
against the
objections

If, now, there is such disintegration in the field of science, how is scientific unity attained? The answer is found in the fact that in each of the special sciences the choice of subject matter, the manner of manipulating it, the mode of conceiving it,—all are constantly determined by some single definite idea.

Pedagogy, too, is guided by a single idea: the idea of education. In accordance with its own determinate viewpoint it appropriates of the fulness of life and reality whatever suits this leading idea. For pedagogy, educating is not a disconnected series of human actions, but one ideal totality that makes sense and has significance. And, hence, though its subject-matter comes largely from other fields, pedagogy can nevertheless be a science.

That man discovers in education a significant whole with its own nature and laws is already suggested by the fact that it occurs to him to form the concept of education. And just, if this be true, as one might expect, reflection on education has not tarried till the various sciences had reached a certain maturity, then to gather a handful of erudition from each. But pedagogy has grown out of the very concept and idea of education, and in the measure that it grew more and more conscious of what it intended it sought auxiliary material in the various sciences.

However many, then, the auxiliary sciences may be, the unity of its concept of education makes of pedagogy a unified science.

And so there is no justification either for separating off a part of pedagogy—for example, that which can be tested directly by experience or experiment—and for recognizing only this part as scientific while all the rest is relegated to the limbo of subjective opinions. As we have seen, there is no warrant for thus limiting science to the measurable and quantitative. Rather, just as theology has as its business to treat scientifically the revelation of God, and philosophy one's view of the universe, so pedagogy should trace in systematic fashion the various factors in the educational process.

That pedagogy is entitled in its own right to be called a science does not mean, however, that it can be assigned to a definite niche in a single schema embracing all the sciences. There is no such single schema. The division of the sciences into physics, chemistry, physiology, psychology, and so forth, proceeds from points of view which are foreign to the idea of pedagogy, and which will never permit pedagogy to come to its own. Pedagogy separates what in the types of sciences mentioned is united; it unites what for them is separated. A division of the sciences along a single dimension is, as was said, impossible.

The Character of Pedagogy

Only in the completed science of pedagogy as a whole does its character become evident. An introduction can merely anticipate. So Ba-

vinck's "Introduction" limits itself to one of the chief considerations: the impossibility of attaining adequate results by means of pure experience,—assuming there is such a thing; and the consequent relation between pedagogy and one's whole view of the universe, indemonstrable as the view may be. Further development of the issue Bavinck postpones till later pages.

A few remarks may be appended.

Every science must begin with some tentative definition of its field; so the science of pedagogy must by way of limitation form a provisional notion of what education is. Bavinck's differentiation between education in the broader and in the narrower sense may be accepted as valid. Education in the narrower sense will then be the conscious guidance given the growing individual in his transition from the immature state to maturity. There is a matter in this connection, however, that deserves more attention than Bavinck gives it. The mature individual, too, changes; and spiritual development may in a certain sense be said never to cease—no matter how "mature" the individual. And since this adult development is still subject to conscious guidance, one's education may be said never to terminate. Evidently, then, there is education which is intentional and yet which does not fall within the definition, since it does not terminate at "maturity". For the same reason the aim of education is not yet as such to be identified un-

A difficulty
in Bavinck's
definition of
education

qualifiedly with the ideal of "being human", though the two are closely related.

But we turn to another matter suggested by the last remark with its reference to educational ideals. Every educator in his teaching assumes a certain definite attitude toward his work, he has his own definite methods, and he sets himself certain ideals. What now can pedagogy do for him?

Pedagogy of the type that has been denominated "prophetic" preaches ideals, demonstrates attitudes, recommends specific methods, and succeeds in finding those who are hearers and doers of its word; but their hearing and doing is always relative to the several natures of the hearers and doers. And this relativity is wholly natural; ideals cannot be transplanted, attitudes cannot as living be imitated; only methods can be taken over, though there is always the danger, torn from their context as they are, of even their failing. Briefly, the power of this kind of pedagogy lies in its suggestiveness.

A useful
result of
pedagogy of
opinion

Scientific pedagogy in the stricter sense, it must be admitted, lacks this suggestiveness, and in so far lags behind the "prophetic" type. But, by way of compensation, though as science it does not create ideals it can bring them to self-consciousness, can make evident their real character, can point out their relation to and influence on the world of reality. Scientific pedagogy proves no principles, but it does proceed from them. And it can also deal with these

The advantage
of pedagogy
as a science

principles scientifically, can discern their mutual relations and their power and scope, can teach us to distinguish between abiding principle and changing application,—and so on through the whole field of education. The science of pedagogy views the process of education as precisely non-science, as a vital influencing which is determined by many a non-reflective factor. And it accepts the task of penetrating the field with the light of science, and even of tracing the influence on the educator both of the prophetic preaching and of the scientific treatment of pedagogical ideas.

The "Introduction" lacks something one might expect it to contain,—a summary statement of the method which pedagogy should employ in dealing with its material. We shall find occasion to touch on the question later.

The divisions of Bavinck's book are fundamentally as follows: an "Introduction", then a chapter each on "The Aim", "The Startingpoint" and "The Method of Education".

It is the present writer's intention in what follows to provide first a summary of Bavinck's chapters on "The Aim" and "The Startingpoint", then a discussion of both taken jointly, and finally a summary and discussion of Bavinck's treatment of "Method".

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF BAVINCK'S DISCUSSION OF "THE AIM IN EDUCATION"

The Aim Among Various Nations

IN education the aim is of fundamental importance. It varies not only in the subsequent periods of history, but is also most closely related to the entire religious or philosophic outlook upon life in any specific period.

With the Assyrians and Babylonians, the Persians and Egyptians, the aim of education was largely religious; with the Chinese it was more ethical.

Among the Greeks and Romans the purpose of education was principally controlled by the prevailing concept about the State and in addition to this social-ethical purpose had an aesthetic character in the sense that education was not to train for handicraft or a trade but for the development of such capacities and abilities as would adorn the free citizen. A more universally human ideal did not arise till much later.

The Aim Among Israelites and Christians

With Israel education was national but in a special sense, for its distinctiveness as a nation

was its very relation to its God from whose hand it received the contents of education in the form of the law and of history. Consequently, education among Israel is not only national but from beginning to end religious and theocratic also.

With the arrival of Christianity this limited national character is set aside, but the relation to God remains the very centre of life, and is still more accentuated. Not man's intellect or virtue, rank or position, wealth or honor, but whether he is a child of God defines his worth and determines his lot. Regeneration is a first requisite, but it is also required that he continuously strive to enter in. (Luke 13:24.) In this way everything is staked on man's individual attitude, and still through baptism the individual is incorporated into a new society. Through the new religious relationship the individual becomes free but always as member of a group.

Three unique
results of
being a child
of God

All this had the greatest significance for education. In the gospel man received a treasure of great value, a truth reaching beyond him but at the same time educating him to its own level. Thus human development becomes not an aim in itself but finds its purpose in the assimilation of the absolute truth of God.

Secondly, this absolute truth became a nucleus for truth in other spheres. Christianity did present the central truth but not all truth, and as a result education derives its subject matter not only from Scripture but also from nature and

history. However, in its central truth Christianity gave an organizing principle that could reform and animate all knowledge and science. In this way Christianity became a means for concentrating all nurture and education.

In the third place, the Christian religion developed a new outlook upon all of natural life.

"Citizenship, national consciousness, and class consciousness were not the highest ideals. And at once by reason of the divine institution and by the example of Christ and the apostles the simplest occupation and the humblest handicraft became sanctified." (30)

Thus the way was cleared for establishing the relation between education and vocation.

Five Opposing Forces

Yet, this interpretation of Christianity regarding the common and central basis of education and vocation could not so easily be applied. In opposition to the worldliness which had entered the Christian church there was developed the ideal of asceticism. Originating in the Romish church it appeared later in altered fashion in the Protestant church as anabaptism, pietism, methodism, etc. According to this ideal only piety, communion with God, and the life hereafter have any value. To be occupied with earthly affairs, it was argued, is not necessarily sinful but is to be occupied with reality of a lower order; it is not quite possible to ignore these earthly matters entirely, but it is alto-

Asceticism
and Pietism

gether impossible to look upon them as a service to and a glorification of God.

So limited, education is actually confined to the religious sphere; and the only way of giving secular instruction—since it cannot be entirely omitted—a religious tint, is by teaching languages and history and mathematics and geography from Bible texts. “Asceticism denies the natural setting to the child, who is the subject in education, and to the contents and the aim of education.” (32)

Humanism

This asceticism met a reaction—as it always will in the Christian world—in the form of humanism, which, in general, is the philosophic movement proclaiming as its ideal the harmonious development of human nature in its entirety. One should remember that one wing places more emphasis on the intellectual development and is more aristocratic while another wing stresses more the development of the will and is more democratic. But both wings find the highest educational ideal in man and in man alone. The aim is always the purely individualistic one of the development and perfection of personality, though this perfection is to benefit fellow men and to ennoble the human race.

Realism

Parallel to humanism, which first revealed itself plainly about the time of the Reformation, and almost simultaneously there arose another force in the philosophic realm, which may be named realism. While the distinctiveness of

humanism was a looking backward to the classics of the Romans and especially to those of the Greeks, realism sought its bearings in the present. Humanism concentrated its efforts in the interpreting of books, monuments, and other relics of antiquity, and in seeking after erudition and eloquence.

Realism, on the other hand, applied itself to things and studied nature in order to know it and to control it. It did not reverently look back to the past but considered itself the proud master of the future.

This attitude expressed itself further in disapproval of contemporary education. Fewer words and more things, less memory work and more reasoning, less authority and more independence were wanted. Before everything else, realism demanded naturalness. The subject matter might no longer be dished out to the student as a foreign substance; he himself should reach after this content as a result of a natural growth process, and should then assimilate such material as fitted his capacities. For that reason the teacher was to start from observation, from the near, and from the simple and then proceed to reasoning, to the more remote, and to the complex.

In the course of time this movement for realism—which even more than humanism made man the point of departure, the criterion, and the aim in education—increased its momentum and developed some extreme and ultimate

Modern
pedagogy as
an offshoot
of Realism

positions which are most clearly revealed by the so-called "Reform-pedagogues".

Among these leaders we notice, in the first place, a strong dislike for existing conditions in the education at home and in school. This education, it is argued, instead of developing kills all personality, and instead of allowing the child to live in terms of his own nature makes him subservient to various other purposes.

Hence a radical reformation which will produce a new and better race is imperative. Even before the child is born, we must aim at racial betterment. And once born, the child should immediately become the centre of education. Not the parents, not the teachers, not the subject matter, not the state or society, but the child alone is centre and norm for the entire scheme of education. The art of educating the child in reality consists in not educating him; the task of education is to insure the child's perfect freedom by exercising a policy of "hands off". Nature also here must help herself; she may not be suppressed but may at best only be led. The so-called defects of children merely seem to be such; they are but the reverse of their good qualities. Hence we are to cease all talk of exhortation, discipline, force, punishment, and subjection to obedience. Both home and school must teach the child to live his own, personal, and individual life.

Untenableness of These Educational Ideals

Modern pedagogy then finds the aim of education in man and in man alone; everything higher than he is being ignored, and all order and every norm is to be derived from his own nature.

In the elaboration of this theory, however, one faces various difficulties leading to hopeless contentions. If man is the final aim in education, and if no other factors help decide this aim, it is, for example, impossible to determine whether education should be directed toward the development of the individual, or to the welfare of society. And this is a question which in our present day society with its strongly socialistic trend, has become a basic one. If it be impossible to reach an agreement, either society will be sacrificed to the individual or the individual to society.

First
objection:
a dilemma

"There are, however, still many other and weightier reasons why man cannot be the norm and aim in education. It is human nature itself, which reaching beyond itself informs us through its own relationships to higher things of a loftier educational ideal." (47)

Three more
objections

In the first place, man is a dependent creature who not only as individual depends upon his fellow beings, but also together with these is finite and limited on all sides.

Moreover, man is not only a material but also a rational-moral creature. He has reason, heart and conscience, and these point upward to a

higher and ideal world to which man is bound. He is a citizen in a kingdom of invisible and eternal things. Whoever confines education to this present life does violence to human nature.

In the third place, human consciousness gives evidence not only of ideas, but also of norms and laws, which demand unreserved obedience, and which point back to a Law-giver. The consciousness of God has been implanted in every human being. Religion is part of the essence of man. And for education simply to ignore this religious nature is inexcusable.

The Christian Educational Ideal

Unique
educational
feature of
Christianity

"On the contrary Christianity in all its aspects completely agrees with the data which human nature itself affords us through impartial investigation." (49)

And not only does the Christian religion fit reality, but it also raises us to the level of truth. It not only accords with nature, but it also through grace restores nature.

Definition of
Christian
educational
ideal

So conceived, Christianity may be said to have as educational ideal—in the words of the apostle Paul—"that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." (II Timothy 3:17.)

Its
significance

In this ideal all contrasts are reconciled. The man of God is the true, the genuine, the complete man, who is thoroughly human, and who as man of God is free and independent over against the world. But the man of God is to be

thoroughly furnished unto all good works, and this includes his calling and occupation—all his duties, which as member of the social group he has to fulfill.

The very loftiness of this ideal is the reason why so often man errs in his attempt at realization. For instance, some by overemphasizing the phrase "men of God" and by neglecting the expression "unto all good works" caused the reaction embodied in humanism and realism. Others have completely severed "good works" from "men of God" so that as a result both asceticism and pietism seemed justifiable. The Reformed view has always attempted to include both elements.

Violation of
the ideal

"The harmony found in the Christian ideal is so far best expressed in and maintained by the Reformed church and its confession." (51) The Reformed world view adorns all reality, even the most commonplace, with the nobility of God. Man, first of all, is God's creature and never finds the purpose of his existence in himself. This fact is basic and therefore in nurturing man into a man of God it should be our criterion. A corollary of this lofty conception of man and of the educational ideal is that in the midst of the world man is obliged to a service of his God and to be furnished unto all good works.

Its requisites

"Johann Sturm, a friend of Calvin and a kindred spirit, who founded a gymnasium in Strassburg in 1537—an institution since used as a model by many others—de-

An early
Calvinistic
formulation

scribed this Scriptural educational ideal as 'Sapiens atque eloquens pietas', i. e. as piety united to wisdom and eloquence." (51)

Making proper allowance for the time in which this formulation was written, we may restate it as follows:

Modern
definition
with
three aspects

"The substance of and the principal aim in education was true piety, a real godliness, child-like fear of and service to God. But this piety might not be isolated. It had, on the contrary, to be united with wisdom, with knowledge of *things*, with genuine, thorough knowledge. But even so the ideal of education is not sufficiently described, because this piety and knowledge may not remain outside of us or beyond us. It may in no wise be a mere treasure, stored away in our minds without any influence upon our lives. It must become a molding force within us; it must be spiritually assimilated; it must enter our inmost being and there renew and fashion us. Piety so united with knowledge should mold our entire personality in appearance, in word, and in deed. And the ideal of a Christian education at home, in the elementary schools, in high schools, and in universities remains now as then: true piety, organically related to thorough knowledge and genuine culture (*Bildung*). In this way we *nurture* men of *God*; furnished unto *all good works*; *thoroughly* furnished unto all good works." (52-53)*

* The reader will find a very elucidating, interesting, and thorough discussion of the systems of education reviewed in this chapter in pp. 183 to 286 of Rosenkranz's *Philosophy of Education*, Appleton & Co., 1889.—Tr.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF BAVINCK'S DISCUSSION OF "THE STARTINGPOINT IN EDUCATION"

Need for Psychology

"The essence of education is determined not only by its aim but fully as much by its startingpoint. It is not sufficient merely to know for what purpose we educate; we must also know the child who is to be educated. What is he? What is he as human being? What is he as child? What innate capacities did he bring with him? And how much of him comes from the environment, becoming gradually his own spiritual possession after intense effort on his part? Pedagogy rests on the basis of anthropology and particularly of psychology." (54)

There are abundant reasons for holding "that beyond any doubt a thorough psychology is both necessary and indispensable for pedagogy." (54)

But psychology is a difficult study.

The older psychology relied mainly on introspection as a means of collecting data about the soul and went on to infer by reflection its very nature, gratefully accepting the light spread by special revelation on the origin, the essence, and the destiny of man.

"Rational"
psychology

New Movements in Psychology and Objections

The new psychology deemed it more advisable to concern itself exclusively with the exter-

"Empirical"
psychology

nal manifestations of mental life and in treating them to employ the same methods as are used in the natural sciences. The results of this empirical psychology, however, were relatively meagre because the higher life of the soul could not so be approached and evaluated, and consequently origin, nature, and purpose of the psychical phenomena remained a mystery. Moreover, neither certainty nor unity were attained. "There are as many psychologies as there are psychologists." (59)

First
objection

This psychology cannot serve as a basis for pedagogy. In the first place, it is too much uncertain as to its own point of departure, method and results.

Second
objection

Secondly, one must remember that psychology can serve pedagogy only in terms of general laws and principles, and these are not the outcome of so-called exact investigation but of "reflection, i. e. of philosophy". (60)

Third
objection

In the third place, modern psychology cannot answer the question whether we must "consider man a developed animal or an image bearer of God" (61) because it excludes from its investigations all attempts at solving such questions. This does not, however, prevent philosophic considerations from creeping in. Indeed, philosophy is indispensable to psychology and pedagogy. But if that is true, we prefer the Christian philosophy to a philosophy which is always changing and is full of whims and caprices.

A recent development in modern psychology is the special study of the mental life of the child. Later, pedagogical pathology, a study of various child diseases and defects, was added; with the result that school hygiene and mental hygiene developed as separate sciences, a fact which in turn explains the evolution of various requisites regarding the architecture of school buildings and equipment, schedules of work, vacations, nature of subjects taught, size of assignments, etc.

Child
psychology

No one should overlook the good bound up with this child psychology, even though many of the hygienic requisites were already known. At the same time it would be superficial indeed if one failed to recognize in this movement for child psychology the general spirit of the times, making everything subservient to the rights of the child, adjusting the whole social structure to an ideal education, and expecting that once this education becomes firmly based on exact experimental knowledge it will reach never dreamed of heights, and will have the most salutary effects on the entire social evolution.

Several
warnings

Meanwhile, we do well to be reserved in our expectations from this experimental psychology as applied to children, and to take careful note of the many warnings of psychologists of good repute.

The chief objection, however, which one can raise against this present day psychology, is found in its conscious or unconscious applica-

tion of the Darwinian doctrine of evolution. This doctrine is untenable and with it the assumption that the stages of development in the child's mental life are some sort of an epitomized repetition of the spiritual development of the race. And it is equally absurd to expect that through mere pedagogy we can elevate the race to a higher level.

Furthermore, we must remember that child psychology is possible only in as far as the child's mind is analogous to mature consciousness, so that in the last analysis it is still dependent on general psychology.

For all that, pedagogy has to reckon with both man and child. It must accept the child as he is with all his capacities and abilities, with his dispositions and talents. There is in the child a wealth of inherited qualities, and yet heredity cannot explain this mental equipment. There is in the child development of a personal disposition, but it can never lead to more than was originally present in this disposition. Thus education must proceed from what God gave the child and must guide and mold this for His service.

A final
criticism

The one-sided exaltation of the value of psychology for pedagogy has had this result among others, that diverse aspects have been sadly neglected. Religion has been abandoned and with it the basis for moral education. And yet, no one wishes to dispense with the latter. The outcome is that many an educator is vacil-

lating between an optimistic and a pessimistic outlook upon life so that modern pedagogy is floundering about in an inherent contradiction.

"It *cannot* deny the power of sin, for the misery round about is so unspeakably great; and it *must* deny that power, for else it would commit suicide and thereby surrender all courage for work and all hope for the future." (85)

Basis of Christian Pedagogy

Over against this we place education's debt in the matter of startingpoint to Christianity.

In the first place, Christianity informs us that man is "God's image, His offspring, His son". This characterization is meant in its absolute sense. The very absoluteness differentiates the Reformed confession from both the Roman Catholics and the Lutheran. Man is thus related to God both in his special disposition as individual and as a member of every organization found among men.

The origin of man

Whoever rejects this answer to the question of the origin and essence of man has no answer, and consequently his education is without a basis.

However, it is not pride that prompts Christianity to give this answer, because parallel with this lofty concept of man runs the Christian confession to the fullest extent of the awful reality of sin which touches the entire man and the entire image of God. Pedagogy must reckon with this fact of sin though it need not stop

The reality of sin and grace

here, inasmuch as there is not only sin but also grace.

Common grace In the first place, there is common grace making human life possible. It expresses itself in outward blessings but also in inward blessings, such as maintaining in man reason and intellect, consciousness and conscience, natural love and a sense of truth, religious and moral concepts, sensibility to shame and honor, fear of disgrace and punishment. And "every pedagogy—even though in theory denying it—owes its very existence to this common grace of God." (91)

Special grace Now God added to this common grace a special grace, the grace of regeneration and conversion.

"It pleased Him to dispense these blessings of special grace in the way of the covenant, and therefore not to give them to the adults only, but to the children also; not to the believing parents only, but to their seed also. And of this infant baptism is the seal and security. Christian pedagogy adapts itself to this grace of regeneration signed and sealed in infant baptism. Only because God Himself in Christ regenerates men in His image and after His likeness can Christian pedagogy serve its lofty purpose—the nurturing of men of God, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." (92)

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION OF "THE AIM" AND "THE STARTING- POINT OF EDUCATION"

WE shall discuss the startingpoint and the goal of education in conjunction with each other, though Bavinck, making much of the contrast between them, devotes a chapter to each.

The startingpoint of education is the human status in which the educator finds the child at the beginning; the goal is the human status in which education attains its end. Each, it is evident, refers to some status of man and implies some conception of human nature. Both of Bavinck's chapters in consequence treat in part of the same material. In the chapter on "Aim", humanism, realism, and modern pedagogy, all three, are alleged to find the criterion and the goal of education in man himself; Christian pedagogy is then contrasted as maintaining a true view of man's nature and as with this view also discovering the inadequacy of all other educational aims; the conclusion is drawn that man is designed for a higher life, that of himself he is impotent to achieve it, but that grace gives him the capacity for being moulded into a man of God. And approximately the same

Study of child

1. *Heredity*

2. *Environment*

3. *Individuality*

at birth, 1 & 2 are present, 3 is potential

Startingpoint
and Aim have
a common
basis

all of the factors in human life must be interpreted in terms of one or more of the following facts:
(1) Creation (2) sin (3) grace: common & special
Cath. considers ~~creation~~ ^{creation} as something of a halo around man, Lutheran considers the core of ~~the religious~~ ^{the religious} ~~life~~ ^{life}
Christian Education
the character of man.

very individual reflects the image of God, even tho they are polluted reflections.
line of reasoning is followed and the same conclusion drawn in the next chapter, with its discussion of man's original sonship of God, of the Fall, and of common and special grace.

This Bavinck should have considered first

Bavinck would have done better had he first of all determined the nature of man as man, and had he then on this foundation built his discussion of the goal and the startingpoint of education. That this was not Bavinck's procedure is readily explained by the "practical" character of his book; he was required to affirm a definite position; and the question of aim, as one of the most controverted points in educational theory, had necessarily to occupy the foreground. But considered materially, the procedure Bavinck followed can hardly be approved. Here, incidentally, his failure in the "Introduction" to provide a summary view of the whole field of pedagogy avenges itself.

Inadequacies of Bavinck's metaphor

Bavinck's contrast of the aim or goal of education with the startingpoint demands a brief consideration. Bavinck himself is fond of the contrast, believing that he can in terms of it also define method,—method then being the way to get from one of the contrasted points to the other. But is this whole figure of speech, with its startingpoint, its road to be traversed, and its goal, not a bit misleading? Can we really introduce quite as much separation between the subject and the aim of education as between the point of departure and the goal of a physical journey?

The starting point in education is indeed the child; but the child at what age? Bavinck will surely admit that we mean the child at any stage of his development and that as a matter of course each stage differs from every other. But then though there is throughout the process identity of aim, the subject of the process, the child, changes, and it follows that there must also be a corresponding change in the means of education.

Even so one may of course grant that the metaphor Bavinck employs does in a certain sense reflect his general approach to pedagogy. For him the subject of education is "the" child, whatever his age and whatever the degree of development. And with this Bavinck then contrasts "the" aim of education, which likewise has for him a universal validity. Each must be clearly appreciated, thinks Bavinck, as well as the relation between the two.

*In defense of
Bavinck*

Bavinck indeed limits himself to suggesting leading ideas. That this is true may be indicated by paraphrasing the argument of the two chapters under discussion. It runs somewhat as follows. You may formulate as many merely human aims as you please, but you will never escape one-sidedness; you will always forget that which is most important, the God-given aim to form men of God. And again, acquire all the facts you please about the child, frame your theories, perform your experiments, and all of what you thus obtain will be of some value for

educating, but its value will be very limited; there is after all but one basis for education, namely that the child in principle already is what it is to be, a man of God. So paraphrased, these chapters are marvels of polemics and of the deepening—by means of the very contrast to which reference has more than once been made—of the fundamental convictions which are held by the protagonists of Christian education.

Limitations
of Bavinck's
approach

*Too large
a gap between
startingpt.
& ideal*

Now one may voice his appreciation of this polemical vindication of a few of the fundamentals, and yet be of the opinion that something of importance is lacking. One may find himself in perfect agreement with Bavinck's formulation of the aim of education and with his theory concerning the child, and yet judge that together with vindication of these points more detailed circumscription is necessary and that the testimony of experience, too, should be heard. Motivated altogether too much by the impulse to join issue with all kinds of mounting tendencies, Bavinck's treatment of the aim and the startingpoint of education cannot do justice to the material. What Bavinck gives is worthwhile, but he does not give it in the context and with the background that the material itself demands.

2.

Pedagogy's Startingpoint

Pedagogy is the science of education. While it is true that, in educating, one's aim or goal is

of the utmost importance, still pedagogy cannot take its departure from this aim. The aim is a definite human status or level to which the educator hopes to bring the pupil, just as the pupil is also and always a human being at a definite level or status. Consequently unless one knows what is implied in being human, it is impossible to put any significant questions.

3. The basic question in pedagogy: "What is man?"

Bavinck does touch this.

It is from our knowledge of human nature that we are to infer the possibility of formulating an aim and pursuing it, and only after establishing the possibility can we ask what that aim ought to be. And only then shall we be in position to consider the contrast between what we wish to achieve (a human being at a definite level) and what is already present (the child—a human being at a lower level), and to ask how the transition is brought about. Such a procedure will at the same time enable us to judge which sciences are of value to pedagogy.

The elaboration of these statements in the next few sections is not intended as a complete outline of pedagogy; rather it attempts to acquire some insight into the structure of pedagogy in order that we may the better estimate the value of Bavinck's contribution.

Man and His Nature

To determine the aim of education, then, one must already possess some knowledge of man and of his various capacities. To one who does not know, for example, that there are artists, it

To answer the question requires reflection

will never occur to formulate the educational aim in terms of the artist. Various sciences stand ready to furnish us with knowledge of man, and they are of great importance to education. True, we seem usually to find that to establish the aim of education the knowledge which everyday experience affords, or which is present in unreflective conviction, is sufficient; but even so no one can seriously object to reflecting on the whole question of aim, and if we reflect we shall soon discover the need of supplementing our daily knowledge by science.

Two aspects of human nature
 individual aim
 social aim
 volitional training

Without going far afield, we may note at once that there are two sorts of aims formulated. Aims like health, alertness, happiness, independence, self-reliance, etc., represent one type, while such as fitness to earn one's living, good citizenship, useful membership in church, state, and society, and the like belong to the other. And these two types of pedagogical aim are essentially two types of view concerning human nature. The first views man as being-for-himself, that is, considered only or at least chiefly as an individual; the second views him as being-for-another, that is, considered in relation to other men, to institutions, to ideal realities like science or art, or, again, to God.

man to God
 self
 other
 nature

The possibility of establishing the aim will depend, therefore, on the knowledge we have of man in these two aspects. And at this point we shall have to supplement our own experience with all sorts of sciences (for example, medi-

cine, so far as we consider health; or economics and sociology when we consider fitness to get through the world). Basically, however, the determinants of the aim are to be found in just two of the sciences: philosophy and psychology. But before considering these, we ought to revert for a moment to the contrast between man-for-himself and man-for-another.

The two sciences fundamental to pedagogy

Some educators lay all emphasis on the first: harmonious development of personality, ability to take care of oneself, cleverness and sensibleness, power to express oneself, and the like; others aim at the second: a perfect member of society, a participant in the ideal goods of humanity, or something similar. Yet the contrast, though of some significance practically, is no absolute one. First, precisely because man has no absolute being-for-self. This is evident the moment one considers that all ideals which intend the individual-for-himself are already such as bring him into definite relation with other-than-self. A "harmoniously developed personality" has a definite relation to science, art, and society; "to express oneself" will certainly involve very definite relations to one's fellow-man. And contrariwise, man never has a single relation to another which is not grounded in his being the individual he is, in his having the individual consciousness that he has. Any one who is of any value as "member of society" will have such value only as he possesses certain definite personal qualities, dispositions, and

The two aspects of human nature inseparable

proficiencies, and only as he has an individual consciousness.

No matter, therefore, which of all possible educational aims one selects one will have to attend to both the individual-in-relation and the individual-for-himself. In the final analysis, the arbiter of questions arising from the former is philosophy, whereas questions that spring from the second are settled by anthropology,—for our purposes by the particular anthropological science of psychology.

Man-in-relation and Philosophy

The relation
aspect

We treat man then first of all as a being who is at all times in various relationships. And to the fact that such relationships are many, the various sciences clearly bear witness.

Numerous as these relations are, certain of them are admittedly much more fundamental than others (the relation to God is such, for example). How now are we to think these basic relations?—The answer depends on one's whole view of the universe; that is to say, scientifically, on one's philosophy. But since pedagogy if it would be scientific must consider these basic relations, and since one's view of basic relations is one's philosophy, pedagogy will have to form contacts with philosophy.

To everyday consciousness this fact may not be directly apparent. Vocation,—whether one is artisan or lawyer or doctor,—and social status,—whether one is criminal or good citizen,

very worthy
Philosophy
fundamental
to pedagogy
1. Look at life
from totality
view of reality

—and other such empirical, proximate relationships of the individual often occupy completely the foreground of daily consciousness. And these are indeed relations deserving and receiving serious consideration from pedagogy. But when we get to the bottom of things, the answer to the question "What shall my boy or girl choose as life work?" and to similar immediate questions will be seen to depend on insight into not this or that relation but all relations. At bottom we face the question, "What is man? What does it mean to be human?" and this question involves insight into the whole universe of relations,—in other words, involves philosophy. What we have called "prophetic pedagogy" also, spite of all its emphasis on empirical relations, finds itself ultimately calling for "the new man".

Once the philosophic character of the question "What is man?" is clearly seen, the logical weakness of the basis of many pedagogical theories and propheticisms is immediately apparent; they do see the importance of man's relation to objective reality, but they arbitrarily abstract a fragment from out of objective reality and take it for the whole. Such abstraction may have its advantages on occasion, but the result should not be passed off as a complete, indeed, as the final theory of education.

By way of illustrating the point just made, we may cite the naturalistic theories of education, which look upon man as a fragment of nature, and no more. It is possible, of course, to attack

The
philosophic
approach
makes possible
proper
evaluation of
all fragmentary
theories

the content of these theories while admitting that they call attention to neglected truths; but one need not go the length of considering their content. All we need is to remember the demand that man shall be viewed in his relation to the whole universe, and naturalism already stands condemned. This type of refutation may not at once impress the lesser lights, but its influence will none the less gradually work down. Was it not, similarly, the onslaughts of philosophy which caused materialism, the forerunner of modern naturalism, gradually to withdraw?

And it is just this same consideration of the totality of human relationships which affords the criterion for evaluating whatever of worth is yielded by theories built on abstractions.

A pragmatist's objection to the philosophical approach

There are people a-plenty who consider this present approach of ours as next to worthless. / Why bother yourself, say they, with abstractions like the question, "What is man?" Rather look about and see what the demands of life today are and then educate your children to meet these demands. One may find even Christians if not voicing at least putting into practice the same idea.

Nor is the position limited to "practical" people; similar voices are raised among pedagogical theorists;—a fact considered by Bavinck in his *De Nieuwe Opvoeding*. Why is it that this question as to the essential nature of man and similar questions touching the philosophi-

cal basis of pedagogy are found uninteresting? The answer lies in the desire to have the aim of education determined by circumstances, which are, of course, never the same in any single time nor in any single country, instead of having it established in its universal aspects.

*I give
relative
education*

Admittedly, there is an element of truth here. To the insistence that pedagogy should consider modern life and its demands, one can, of course, register no objection. But with respect to the rest of the position, we would point to the fact that its "practical minded" exponents are "practically" answering the very questions which they hold to be so abstract. What is man? For them he is a being that should get through this life as well as possible.

Once more, Christians too are among these exponents,—though indeed the Christian adds something to the view; man is a being who should get through this life well, but who also should make a good exit from this life. But however such a Christian may emphasize the importance of the added qualification, it remains an addition; this life and that hereafter are sundered; man is a dual being, not a living unity. And surely this is not sound Christianity, it is not Calvinism. Nor is it a position that can consistently be maintained.

The objection is inconsistent with Christianity;

For many thinkers one of the most unhappy characteristics of our day, and one of the most fateful pedagogically, is indeed precisely such splitting and breaking up of life and such isola-

its point of view is indefensively narrow;

tion of human relationships. For us today a man is, for instance, a merchant; and, alongside, he is also an honest or a dishonest individual; and, again, a member of the church or not a member; and, once more, belongs or does not belong to a certain political or other party, and so on;—in short, he is all these things severally; the unity of life is absent or ignored. And there is real danger that each of us, lacking an objective universal centre, becomes his own centre and so—paradoxical as it may sound—helps along the very decentralization and disintegration which is deplored.

nor is it found
with leading
pedagogical
movements

Once more, the trouble lies not in the attempt to do justice to concrete reality but in taking that concreteness in altogether too immediate, too fragmentary, too abstract a fashion. The more important movements in the field of pedagogy, those which Bavinck discusses, have never limited themselves to the narrow viewpoints afforded by the circumstances of any moment. One whose pedagogical task is limited to the educating of a few individuals may be satisfied to keep “concrete” interests in the foreground; those who have reflected on the nature of education have always had in mind a broader context; they have at least intended to find the relation of man to the totality of things; they have had an implicit or explicit philosophy.

Consider, for example, those educators who have insisted mainly on physical culture. They are motivated not merely by the greater pleas-

ure to be derived from health and strength; their program involves a view of human life. They think of man simply as a living organism in the world of nature. For them man is organically one with nature. As individual and as species he must maintain his position and be able, surrounded by all the dangers which threaten his life, successfully to wage the struggle for existence. And this is the reason why his body must be strong. His spiritual capacities ultimately serve only to assist him and his species in that struggle for existence.

So with all important movements in pedagogy. Consciously or unconsciously they proceed from a general view of human nature.

But there is an interesting detail which invites further scrutiny. All these movements, whatever form they take explicitly, view man in relation to an ideal reality; that is to say, in relation to a reality which is invisible and intangible. This is true even of the naturalistic movements which look upon man as part of the world of nature, visible as that world indeed is. For nature, to the naturalistic thinker, is not a collection of visible objects, but a well-ordered whole with inflexible laws. But neither that order nor those laws are actually perceptible; they form an architectonic of thought; they are an ideal construction. Even the most materialistic interpretation of man is in essence thoroughly idealistic, and in consequence thoroughly self-contradictory.

The leading views not only consider the totality of relations, but implicitly make the spiritual fundamental

The same idealism is evident in the case of those who wish to have man viewed primarily as a member of society. Of course the activity and turmoil of people round about us is something we can see and experience. But society as an ordered whole of individuals in which the behavior of each influences that of the other, and in which all together produce a totality of goods which in turn are in a specific manner distributed and enjoyed,—this again is a structure which cannot be perceived with the senses but which is the product of thought and which can be “seen” only by the mind.

This idealism inherent in all movements is still more evident in all attempts to relate man to science, art, religion, and the like. Here again there is something present that can be perceived,—books, instruments, paintings, musical compositions, churches, religious ceremonies—but what gives essential significance to these matters is a world of another order which indeed utilizes these material expressions but itself is of an immaterial character.

The basic
issue:
What is the
spiritual?

Every major pedagogical movement, therefore, whether wittingly or no, relates man to an ideal reality. And all depends on whether one views that ideal reality adequately and in its purity, or whether one is blind to certain of its specific aspects such as the religious and the moral; that is, whether one views it totally or in abstraction. This is the whole issue between philosophers; on this issue Bavinck took posi-

tion. And so Bavinck is led to oppose especially an evolutionistic philosophy of nature and a socialistic philosophy of society; in antithesis to both he places man in relation to God, from whom, too, are nature and society. This relation of man to God is for Bavinck central; man is created by God, is created in the image of God, is depraved by sin, is preserved from the worst by common grace, and is in principle restored by special grace; the world of nature is the work of his Father; his fellow men with him are sons of the same family.

Of course, all this should be elaborated into a philosophical anthropology, — something Bavinck, too, had not yet worked out. Especially the problem of harmonizing man's relation to God with his relation to creation is difficult and is one of long standing. These difficulties, however, leave the position unchanged in all essentials, and the task set remains as it was; — especially for pedagogy, whose business it is in no wise independently to work out an anthropology, that is to say, a complete philosophical view of human nature in all its fundamental relations to the visible and invisible worlds.

We may view these fundamental relations of man descriptively, suggesting what man's place in the scheme of reality actually is; this is the procedure we have just been following. But we may also view these same relations from the standpoint of values.

The difference between the two points of view

The objective
relations of
man may be
viewed
descriptively
or normatively

may be elaborated in a series of contrasts. Thus one may recognize that man is actually in relation to nature, but one may also evaluate that relation as one of mastery, a mastery through which man constantly increases the number of natural goods which he enjoys. So, too, one may consider man's actual membership in society but one may also evaluate social relationships; may, for example, recognize a constant progress in society such that it not only increases its mastery over nature, but that there is a constantly better division of natural goods. And one may attend to man's actual relation to science, art, and the like, but one may also evaluate these relationships; may, for example, judge that there is progress in scientific insight, or may attend to aesthetic appreciation, or to the normative, obligatory character of right and morality.

All such evaluation, now, implies an ordering of human relations in terms of worth or value, and hence cannot escape formulating some ideal for man. And just as all educational movements explicitly or implicitly proceed from some view of man's actual relations to nature, society, and to the ideal realm, the last being of central importance, so all these movements whether consciously or not also formulate some ideal for man. And just as the adjudication of the different views on man's actual nature involves us in philosophy, so too with the settling of the views on man's ideal nature.

We have been brought to a juncture where some discussion of the aim or ideal of education is pertinent. For Bavinck, it will be remembered, of all man's actual relations the most fundamental is his relation to God; this same relation determines for Bavinck the human ideal: "The man of God, made perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works."

Both
determined by
man's relation
to God

The question is, however, whether this general human ideal can serve without further definition as the aim of education. A formulation like that quoted it is true has an effective emotional fervor about it, but it is also characterized by a certain vagueness, in part due to its being torn from its context in the Pauline epistle,—a context in which it has much more definiteness. It is not a matter of accident that Bavinck himself provides a more concrete rendering of the educational ideal in the revised formula of Sturm: "sincere piety, organically one with sound knowledge and genuine culture." But even so we are left with a certain indefiniteness. What, after all, is to be understood by "sincere piety", by "sound knowledge", by "genuine culture", and wherein consists the "organic unity"?

The aim of
education in
this light

The remark just made is not a criticism; one cannot expect to find everything contained in a particular nutshell. A formula like Bavinck's has satisfied its purpose if it grasps the nuclear idea and if it suggests a more detailed elaboration. Then, too, in his further exposition of the formula Bavinck adds definiteness to his mean-

ing. But even taking all this into consideration, Bavinck's treatment suffers from the fact that it could not sufficiently be linked up with a philosophical anthropology, a philosophical doctrine of man, of his nature, and of his place in the universe.

The educa-
tional aim
and individual
differences

When once out of man's fundamental relation, that to God, we have systematically developed man's relation to the totality of things, we shall also be better able to recognize the unity of the many-faceted educational ideal. And we shall especially be better able to emphasize the fact that universality of educational aim must at the same time mean individuality of application. In other words, though the aim is always universal, education is always individual and unique, and the aim must be so formulated as to reckon with this fact. This element of uniqueness, it seems, is contained in the notion that each man has a place and a calling; to each is given a name which none knows but he who receives it; each stands in a unique relation to God and the world, a relation valid for him alone. A mere offhand denial that pedagogy, universal like every science, can reckon with this particularity is not sufficient.

Education then must aim at causing each individual to search and to prepare himself for the place in the universe which he and no one else has in accordance with divine decree to take.

Man-for-himself and Psychology

So much for the non-psychological aspect of the question as to man's nature.

We have been considering man-in-relation—in relation to the objective world. But these relations to the objective are also partially present in human consciousness; that is to say, they have a subjective side, they may be viewed psychologically. It is true that things about me—sunshine, rain, plants, animals—have an objective significance of which I am not always or not fully aware, but it is also true that much of physical reality is taken up into my consciousness and evaluated as useful or harmful, attractive or repulsive, and so on. It is true that the treasures of art and science have objective existence, but it is also true that one individual is conscious of one fragment, another of another, and that we severally differ in the manner in which we become progressively conscious of these treasures; in other words, that subjective experience of them differs. It is true that in religion there exist objective relations such as regeneration and conversion, but it is also true that each one of us experiences these in his own way.

Every relation
has a
psychological
aspect

Now it is this subjective, individual experiencing of objective relations which is investigated by psychology. From the history of psychology it appears that man concerned himself first with the external, the perceptible world, and only afterward with his own experi-

encing, with the subjective, the inward life. And when he did become interested in psychology, he still used his relations to the world round about him in getting at his own inner share in those relations and in that world. Psychology originally had no content of its own; it considered simply one particular activity of man among many others. Nearly all psychical terms can be traced back to names of activities,—activities which had a material significance, which denoted something that can also be perceived by others.

Psychology
basic to peda-
gogy yet often
unsatisfactory

If our contention that the point of departure in educational theory is man and his nature, is correct, then education cannot be indifferent to knowledge of that subjective experiencing in which objective human relations become manifest in consciousness. And from this point of view one can understand not only Bavinck's statement that pedagogy is based on psychology, but also his complaint that the psychology of his day was inadequate. If the older faculty psychology was unable to find a satisfactory way of maintaining the substantiality of the self in its dependence on the objective world, the psychology of Bavinck's day was characterized by still more signal failure. It began by retaining only the relation of the psychical to the immediate sense stimulation and for the rest broke up the soul into fragments. Recently, however, psychology once more seeks points of contact with man as he finds himself in the

midst of an objective reality in whose riches he consciously shares.

And in the measure that these more recent attempts of modern psychology are successful, the empirical element indispensable in answering our question as to the nature of man will be scientifically provided. At present each of us has to provide this necessary element from his own often untrustworthy experience.

In the same measure there will be less occasion for the complaint voiced by Bavinck:

"The one-sided inflation of the value of psychology for pedagogy has this further disadvantage that those other subjects which are of importance to pedagogy are thrust into the background and sometimes into near oblivion; many students of psychology and pedagogy act as though there were no such things as religion and theology, or they dismiss them with a few general and meaningless phrases." (81)

Admittedly, there are such psychologists, but their appearance is only temporary and simply indicates that psychology is for the time being at a low level. Leave psychology alone and it will itself come to realize that it is not capable of answering the central questions of "religion and theology", and on the other hand that it cannot afford to ignore the fields of knowledge in which such questions are treated.

Meanwhile, one might grant the value of psychology for pedagogy in so far as pedagogical discussion is limited to the means of education, and yet all the while suppose that psychol-

Basic, too, in the formulation of the aim of education

ogy is not needed in so far as pedagogy busies itself with the aim of education; that all we need in determining the aim is to state philosophically the objective relation which is entitled to consideration as the human ideal. A moment's consideration will show, however, that there are many objective relations which can be approached only through subjective experience,—in other words, psychologically.

Of course, I can by resorting to a balance actually establish objectively someone's relation to the force of gravitation, without subjectively experiencing what it means to weigh, let us say, two hundred fifty odd pounds, but the personal relation in which the obese individual stands to the gravitational force of the earth can be appreciated only by one who suffers a similar affliction. And the relations between persons likewise demand, generally speaking, a personal subjective experiencing of their meaning. So too the formulation of the pedagogical aim requires insight not only into the objective relation recognized as basic, but as well into its "psychological correlate". Without change, also in the psychological life (from child to adult, for example), determination of an ideal or aim would be impossible.

The objective relations, then, have a subjective side; the objective world manifests itself psychologically. But there are two aspects to this psychological manifestation; and in this manifestation there is also development.

The objective world is for man first of all a world from which he receives impressions and to which he reacts. This aspect of the world, the world as environment which stimulates us and evokes response, is primary for the child in his earliest years; to all sorts of stimuli from it the child reacts with innate reflex movements or with random movements or with instinctive movements which are innate yet soon modified. It must not be supposed, however, that this aspect of the objective world is peculiar to childhood; part of adult activity is also of this unreflective type. If I am driving an automobile through busy traffic, my impressions are immediately transmuted, each of them, into some definite action.

The conative aspect of the psychological world

reflex movements

man reacts

But there is another aspect. When there is no such immediate activity required, we are also aware that there is existent round about us a reality which is interesting in its own right entirely apart from any reaction we might make to it, and which is given us in perception. Something of this sort begins soon to make its appearance even in childhood, though unconsciously; just seeing and hearing things already awakens the child's interest.

The cognitive aspect

So the world is for man not simply an environment to which he reacts but is as well a world observed, cognized, viewed. And this viewing is not limited to sense perception. A child soon observes something of the moods and feelings of those in his proximity; later, perception and

How the world of cognition grows

observes not only since perception

imagination and communication enrich his world,—a world that increases its compass as the child grows older, and that embraces not only visible things but in time also includes the realm of concepts and ideas, of laws and standards, of spiritual things and divine revelation, of beauty and art. Governed by norms and in accordance with the laws of psychology, the objective world of man's cognitive experience takes shape in these subjective molds. This objective world as cognized varies from individual to individual,—in extensiveness or in orderliness, for example; indeed, all the rich variegation of human life is reflected here. The ways of viewing not only the world of perception but as well the world of the true, the beautiful, the good, and the divine, are legion.

For our purposes it is not necessary in this connection to treat in detail of perception, memory, imagination, thought, and all the psychological functions which assist in the construction of the individual's known world. But emphatically, though it is a cognized world, a known world, the construction is not the work simply of the so-called intellectual functions. Not to mention the additional riches which the known world receives just through man's struggle to conquer it, there are active in the construction of the known world such conative forces as the mere love of seeing, the need of variety, the urge to unity, the aversion to disharmony and contradiction, and so on; nor is

there ever a condition of purely passive receptivity. And besides the intellectual and conative factors, there is always present, too, an emotional value; the extension of one's horizon, one's contact with things and persons, one's aesthetic impressions, all influence feeling and give a definite direction to activity. As Aristotle already observed, all men by nature desire to know.

observation
+
reflection
cognition.

We take delight in merely viewing the world, apart from its being an environment for our action. And we may note that not only this viewing as such gives satisfaction, but that reflection—whether in selfcomplacency or with gratitude to a Creator—on one's self as subject of the viewing and as the being who in his thinking is master of his material, arranges it, thinks it through,—in its turn awakens various reactions.

In other words, as we consider the growth of the world as viewed or cognized, we are brought back to the world as environment for our actions. And indeed there is no separation between the two; they are two sides of the same reality.

Now just as the cognized world develops gradually from a nucleus, so too the world as object of conation, as environment for action. At first the situation to which we respond is relatively simple and external, requiring no more than a simple reaction, a reflexive or instinctive reaction which, since it is innate, we

How the world
of conation
grows

find ready to hand. But gradually the situations become more numerous, more complex, and more variegated, and the precise reaction proper to any particular occasion is no longer found innately present but is acquired, is learned. The cognized world, the world as object of viewing, we have seen, develops; but this means that the world as environment to which we react, the world as object of conation, also develops. And so too there must be a corresponding growth of the subjective structure which makes these reactions possible. In consequence of this growth, the various tendencies and dispositions no longer act at random but gradually concentrate themselves about certain centres; co-operation between the various functions of the individual is accomplished with less friction; there is greater co-ordination, and this makes for habit and skill. Again, the environment to which the individual reacts expands in space and in time; it is no longer that of immediate perception but acquires spatial and temporal dimensions added by imagination. Then too there are emotional values attached to and in some measure influencing the individual's acts and conations,—whether the acts are intended primarily to change the external world, thus indirectly acquiring emotional value, or whether the acts are intended to change the individual himself, in which case emotional satisfaction is primary and the external world is reduced to the status of instrument.

cooperation
(co-ordinating)
↓
habit + skill
perception adds
time + space +
imagination
emotional values

Briefly, the individual so grows that the original germinal unity of the ego is not dissipated in the multitudinous directions taken by dispositions and tendencies; retaining its integrity, the original unity unfolds itself in various concentrated spheres of activity. In the conative or active aspect as well as in the cognitive or viewing aspect of the psychological world, the original unity of the self is not lost; it simply develops.

Throughout the growth, the self retains its unity

True, there is always the danger of one-sided development of the conative nature but to compensate there is always the striving for harmony. The activities are focused; there are psychical structures which introduce unity into variety. If, following Shand*, we call these structures "sentiments", then we may recognize various types,—differing in direction and in the original impulses out of which they are built. Some are directed toward definite activities, favoring what favors and warding off whatever hinders; such are the sentiments directed toward different amusements, toward sport, collecting, and the like. Other sentiments are directed toward persons or things, whether as species or as individuals; if they root in approval of some person or thing, enjoying his or its presence and welfare, promoting what favors that welfare and averting what thwarts it, they may be called constructive; if they root in aversion and in attempt to harm the object

Sentiments as unifying conative life

* Shand, A. F. *The Foundations of Character.* 2nd Edition, London, 1921.—Tr.

calling forth the correspondingly appropriate emotions, they may be called destructive.

These sentiments are essentially, therefore, of two kinds: love and hate.

Of course sentiments themselves are, relatively, abstractions; they do not exist independently; they are found in mutual relation. Love for one object means at least that some other if not hated is ruthlessly used and spent for the object loved. The sentiment of self-love, for example, essentially uses the whole world for selfish purposes, and in consequence the sentiments toward other people and things are all of the destructive type.

Habit, then, and skill, and sentiment, are concepts which enable us to form some idea of how the simpler reactions of man can and do cooperate and unite. But more than concepts they are not. They are not, for example, so many organs of the soul, but simply represent the various forms in which the soul manifests its integral unity; they are not separate entities by association of which we obtain psychical life, but they are points of view for which the variety of the psychical activities can be seen together with their unity.

Relation of
cognitive and
conative
worlds to the
one self

The soul, then, is organized as a unity manifesting itself in an increasingly varied plurality. And whether you think of the objective world as simple environment evoking native reactions, or whether you think of the objective world as the complex object of human thought, whether

you think of its conative or of its cognitive aspect, in every case the objective world is not independent of the organization of the self. Or to state the matter more correctly, from the beginning of the individual's experience these two aspects of the objective world form a unity such that as reflection grows the world as object of thought or cognition gradually acquires worth in its own right and independently.

In approaching the matter thus, a fact which was originally only intimated attains conscious recognition: that there is active in psychic life a two-fold law. On the one hand we are subject to mechanical laws* such as are manifested in habit, in the acquisition of skill, and in the thrust and counterthrust of different sentiments. But on the other hand, we are subject to ideal laws which require voluntary submission; we are called to obey logical, ethical, and aesthetic norms.

And since as psychical we can live and grow only where there is unity, since the very plurality of conative habits and sentiments already requires centralization, and since the norms are not only consciously present in the cognized world of mature knowledge but already co-operate consciously and unconsciously in the world as environment for reaction,—a harmonious psychical life, a life which neglects none of these factors, can only be rooted in the cardinal sentiment of love to God. Psychology,

The ultimate
implication of
a correct
psychology

* That is, relatively mechanical. There are no pure mechanisms in the life of self.

then, bears witness to the "naturalness" of the first and greatest command. And the proper relation of the sentiments is set forth germinally in the injunction: Thou shalt love God above all and thy neighbor as thyself.

There is still work a-plenty, therefore also for psychology, in establishing the aim of pedagogy. More light can still be thrown on the problem how, for instance, many of the more mechanical psychical structures, such as various types of skill (and much of our "learning" falls in this class) really acquire their rightful estate, really come to their own, only in and through sentiments.

What is the Child?

We have agreed that the startingpoint of education is the fact that children can be fashioned into human beings (in the sense of mature, fully developed human beings). There are three elements here: "children", "human beings", and the "fashioning", that is the transition from the one level to the other. To this point we have considered in the main only one of the three,—the meaning of human being. We have now to indicate something of the nature of the child, and shall conclude the chapter with a remark or two on the nature of the transition.

What is the child?

Here again there is a variety of sciences which have something to contribute by way of answer. But here again the determining factor is, as

Bavinck rightly maintains, one's view of the universe; is, speaking scientifically, one's philosophy. And here again the question will not down as to the value of psychology.

The philosophic aspect of the answer is then of first importance. Bavinck's view is, fundamentally, that the child is in disposition, in capacity, what he is intended shortly to be: a man of God, though indeed imperfectly such yet striving after perfection. And the philosophy antithetical to his own he finds in evolutionistic theses to the effect that education can lead humanity taken as a whole to a higher level or that it can bring each individual to a richer unfolding of what is in him.

The
philosophic
aspect of the
question

It seems to me undeniable that Bavinck in this case as in others manifests a predilection for extremes. And if one's purpose is to set up a warning example, Bavinck's procedure is indeed serviceable. But on the other hand we must in fairness not forget that no cause is ever advanced except it has among its promoters extremists,—optimists who expect beforehand to have their statements discounted. Such hyper-idealists may uncover elements of real worth, as Bavinck, too, admits. Here if anywhere there is need of careful discrimination between that which involves convictions and principles and that which does not.

To determine just how such discrimination can be brought about would require more detailed investigation, for the Christian educa-

tional aim is diametrically opposed to every other, just as that view of the child which considers him as in a covenant relation with God is opposed to every other view of the child. Indeed, the Christian interpretation carried through raises the question whether education is even possible outside the pale of confessing Christianity. Bavinck, it is true, calls attention to God's common grace to which all education is consciously or unconsciously indebted, but this common grace is hopelessly inadequate as a basis for the Christian educational aim. Is education on the basis of common grace still education or is it not? If it is, is our (Christian) educational aim then too narrow? Or must we distinguish between a formal and a material educational aim?

And this brings us to the second and related aspect of the question,—the psychological aspect. For although it is true that Bavinck had little use for experimental psychology, which can yield but meagre results for education, yet he did not deny the value of psychology.

The
psychological
aspect

Unquestionably in this field too there are exaggerated demands and hopes. If the soul were a transparent mechanism and if all reactions could be calculated beforehand, one could with exactness establish an aim and attain it. But today such a mechanistic view is no longer held; it is not even true of the body,—much less then of the soul. And the statistical method with its averages that tell us nothing

about the individual can avail us little. One may rightfully expect more from a "psychology of types" which enriches our individual experience and gives us perspicuity and perspective.

Education as such already rests on a typological division, the division into the child-type and the adult-type. Bavinck too speaks regularly of "the" child, but not sufficiently in typological contrast with "the" adult. And yet it is just the contrast of these two types which is decisive for the educational aim; at least if one wishes to set any limit to the educational process. In a certain sense of course there is no such limit. But education as a systematized process does not continue indefinitely; more or less gradually it comes to an end. In the life of an individual who has grown up without ever having been "educated" in any definite fashion, there is a certain age at which he is not only not educated but at which he is no longer capable of being educated. There are, in other words, differences between children and adults which are quite independent of any definite system of education and which make education beyond a certain point impossible and unnecessary,—except one means under education also to include self-education.

The need of
a "type
psychology"

But if these premises are true, then too the aim of education must have a formal side in distinction from its intrinsic content. Bavinck was, of course, not unaware of this fact; in his *Opvoeding der Rijpere Jeugd* he recognizes the

fact that there are different stages in youthful development, and that education gradually approaches the point at which it definitely either has or has not settled its claims. But Bavinck fails to do justice to the implications for educational theory. He should have remembered this whole set of facts when delineating the aim of education. And if he had, psychology would naturally have received more appreciative attention than it did.

The indispensability of a proper psychology, —a typology of the various stages of development of the youthful soul,—is however fully recognized by Bavinck when he deals with Method in education, as will appear in the next chapter.

The Transition from Child to Adult

Our last statement already brings us into touch with the third element in our agreed educational startingpoint.

Here we lack
scientific
knowledge

The educator desires to give whatever direction can be given to the transitionary movement from child to man. But do we sufficiently attend to the nature of the movement itself? Have we adequate scientific knowledge of the transition which we seek to direct? True, especially in this field the educators are generally well equipped with practical knowledge and empirical generalizations, and much of this practical material has been published, but here again we lack the necessary scientific reassembling and

treatment. This is a field too in which men of varying bias may still profit much by one another's labors.

I have been urging the psychological study of the child in the process of being educated. If we can be persuaded to undertake such a study we shall at the same time uncover the influence not only which proceeds from "the" educator, but as well from the different types of educators. Then too pedagogical handbooks will not only lay down a series of requirements for the teacher, but will also help the teacher to learn to know his own typological peculiarities,—a kind of knowledge that is most useful. There will result a fairer appreciation of the many factors that unconsciously enter into our teaching, and many disappointments will become more intelligible and perhaps more avoidable.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY OF BAVINCK'S DISCUSSION OF "METHOD IN EDUCATION"

IN his last chapter in *Principles of Pedagogy*, Bavinck, treating of "Method in Education", distinguishes two approaches in methodology; the one determining methods in view of the subject-matter, and the other finding methods in terms of the needs of the child.

It is necessary to discuss both separately.

Selection and Organization of Subject Matter: Various Evaluations

Early
Christianity

Christianity places full emphasis on the religious phase so that the schools of the first centuries of the Christian era, originating with the churches, gave little more than religious instruction, while other schools prepared less for life than for science. Popular education from a social point of view in the modern sense had hardly begun at the end of the Middle Ages.

Reformation

The Reformation brought a change. Even then religious instruction constituted the lion's share together with all requisites for this such as reading and writing. At about the same time the reformers and their followers copied their

gymnasias from the Humanists, and these institutions though on the one hand preparatory schools for university work on the other hand encouraged the need for elementary instruction. But even here religious training remained central.

Humanism itself, however, returned to the classics as its sources "to study the embryology of our civilization"* and to find therein for its schools the ideal in education. Humanism

Both Reformation and Humanism in the course of time were opposed by Realism, whose primary concern regarding educational ideals was to insist that the training in schools should satisfy actual social needs. The Realists, beginning their educational movement by pleading for vocational† schools, gradually under the influence of the Philanthropinists developed a plan for the general nurture and education of the citizen, an education similar to that in a modern humanistic school. Our high schools are the outgrowth of this transformation, though they have a dual function: on the one hand they prepare for the industrial life, on the other for science. Realism

The rapid growth of this Realistic influence reveals three outstanding characteristics. Significance
of Realism
in Education:

* Rosenkranz, Johann K. F., *The Philosophy of Education*, p. 278.
—Translators.

† The exact position of these schools in the educational scheme of the secondary schools at that time is clearly revealed in the third chapter of Russell's book on *German Higher Schools* (Longmans, Green & Co.).—Tr.

(1) Religion
slighted

"The first is that the religious element disappears more and more from our educational stage. What was in the foreground is relegated to the remote background, and what was once in that background now looms large in the foreground. Thus an exchange of positions is taking place between earth and heaven; between time and eternity; between visible and invisible things. And even in Christian homes and schools the appreciation for and the application of instruction in religion are on the decline." (103.)

The second characteristic is the strife between Humanism and Realism. To be sure, they do agree in making man the centre and criterion for education; but Humanism still looked upon him as a rational moral being, and hence sought the ideal treasures, which it thought to find in the classics of antiquity. Thus it placed "the word, language, the spirit, literature, art, philosophy, together constituting the liberal arts or humaniora, in the foreground." (104)

(2) The present
exalted.

Realism on the contrary broke with the past. Its aim is to know the present and to control it. One should be ambitious in the struggle for existence and hence long for as few words as possible and a maximal number of things. Arithmetic and geometry, physics and geography, knowledge of modern culture and economy, drawing, handicraft, and art enjoy priority.

(3) Extreme
position
on
athletics

In the third place many outrun Realism, which at least to some extent valued study, and seek their salvation in physical training, considering gymnastics and sport the gate of entrance to the castle of real happiness. Some of these, it is true, are unreflective and without

any theory on the matter; but there are also such as actually believe that a better physical condition will also improve matters spiritually.

Difficulties
for
curriculum
makers and
for students

At any rate, there is much confusion in modern pedagogy regarding the nature of the subject matter. The number of subjects is multiplying at an alarming rate. There is no longer a centralizing principle. And especially he who still clings to the traditional humanistic studies, and at the same time must add both the principal realistic and the super-realistic studies finds himself short of time and complains about his unproductive labors and about mental overloading.

Cause of this
condition

And all this is a result of modern pedagogy's looking upon the child as the norm for education. If the subjects as such no longer have any objective value and the only question is "What is useful?" then one will choose this, and another something else.

Critical
situations

"Pure individualism and egoism are always the outcome of utilitarianism. And if some father should happen to decide that physical training is better for his child than spiritual development; that muscular strength is to be preferred to mental training; that boxing is more useful than reading and writing; that impudence will advance the child more than humility and prudence, then every one who adheres to utilitarian doctrines is simply powerless over against such a father." (107)

Subject Matter as Demanded by Christian Education—Selection of Subject Matter

What in regard to subject matter is the position of Christianity? It is that truth has value

Priority of
truth

objectively and
in itself and is not merely instrument for the development of man. Truth is, indeed, a means *self* for education but at the same time a possession, a treasure, an ultimate aim *by a* toward which man must be educated. "Truth, to be sure, is intended for man, but not according to and neither because of man; man exists much rather because of the truth in order that he might know it and in that way become free." (108)

Its contents

just revealed as in the Bible
This truth then, in the first place, is that revelation which Christ gave us in His person, in His word, and in His work. Now through these channels truth exercises its influence in all domains of life. Christianity attracted to itself from every sphere the good, the true, and the beautiful, and in that process was more concerned to preserve the unity of life view than to acquire a variety of material. And yet this material as totality constituted for Christianity a treasure of objective value.

Christianity
and its im-
port for unity

For that reason Christianity serves as a good basis for science for it acknowledges that there is something that can be known; that this knowledge is unchangeable, outside and beyond us; that we should intensively strive to seek it; and that it can at least in part be found. It presupposes the encyclopedic unity of the sciences and, consequently, makes it quite possible not only to embody all science in a university, but also in the light of its objective value organically to conceive of the subject matter for the elementary school.

Specialization
and unity

Since such an objective evaluation of material is possible, it is quite evident that it is also possible to provide for a proper division of subjects—each as a constituent part of the whole of science. This means that the more specialized instruction becomes the more this division will stand out in bold relief, and that, on the contrary, the less specialized teaching is the more the unity of the subjects will be maintained.

Organization of Subject Matter

Design
central

Two warnings

Proceeding from this organic conception one should give the first and most prominent place to religious instruction. Two dangers ought to be avoided here; viz., limiting this religious teaching to a few schedule hours while the other studies are wholly without its seasoning influences, and allowing all of the curriculum to become religious instruction by deriving the subject matter fittingly or otherwise from the Bible.

How?

"In religious instruction quality is of even more significance than quantity. Its value should not first of all be sought in the fact that the largest number of hours are devoted to it; much rather should we seek its unique worth herein that it is imparted with deep reverence, that it impresses the pupils with God's majesty, and that in such an atmosphere it animates and sanctifies all teaching and activity of teacher and pupil." (111)

Language

With religious instruction as the centre we add first those subjects grouping themselves around language and then those directly related to physical science because using objective value as criterion

History

"there can be no doubt that language and history are superior to mathematics and physics. The soul is worth more than the body; the spirit is nobler than matter; man is more significant than nature; and the ideal goods are richer treasures than those which science can measure and money can buy." (111)

Physics**Principle of unity and principle of relative importance**

This priority of the one group of studies over the other is, however, no reason for choosing classics or modern courses, either to the exclusion of the other. Both are necessary. Moreover, modern courses are needed to enter upon scientific studies; but they must not be looked upon as the only entrance, for then we should be breaking the historical continuity of our civilization. "Just as salvation is of the Jews, so according to the counsel of God the foundations of our entire cultural development are placed in Greece and Rome." (113) Besides, the unity of nations would then be undermined still more.

"While the study of modern languages, nature, and civilization—once loosened from Christianity and the classics—could easily be made subservient to the competitive desire of peoples and nations to surpass one another in industrial and mercantile undertakings, the very instruction in Christianity and in classics is eminently fitted to maintain the truth and the value of idealism above realism." (113)

The place of manual training, etc.

How then, finally, should we deal with manual training and physical culture? They are not opposed to the Christian point of view but rather are promoted by it. Christianity alone has the right evaluation of man's body, which

even as the soul is part of the essence of man. Only, we should take care that the body serve the spirit so that—maintaining this relationship of service—the place of manual and physical training among the other studies in the curriculum be determined accordingly. Of course, all exaggeration so often noticeable in the world of sport is to be condemned.

Presentation or Use of Subject Matter

We now face the question, How must the subject matter be presented or used? There are in general the three following methods:

(1) The multiple sense perception method when the teacher shows either the objects themselves or their pictures, thereby using the child's sense organ for seeing; when he illustrates by sounds, thereby using the pupil's sense organ for hearing; and when he through various bodily movements exemplifies certain activities, thereby calling forth the pupil's response in the form of motor activity.

Three
outstanding
methods

(2) The lecturing method when the teacher imparts knowledge to the pupils through oral communication; and

(3) The question and answer method. This third type is found in various forms; viz., as it occurs in the examinations when the teacher wants to measure the pupil's knowledge; in socratic discussions when he wants to lead the pupil to the right answer; in dialogues where pupil and teacher alternately ask questions and give answers; and in catechetical teaching where question and answer are mere tools to impart information in logical fashion.

What is the value of these various methods? Is it, for instance, justifiable to prefer the socratic method as is done by some?

It depends on the subject. It can rightly be used in arithmetic and geometry, but the truths in history and religion cannot be found. They must be told. Indeed, the lecturing method cannot be excluded from any subject. The principle responsible for overvaluation of the socratic method is that the child himself must find every answer—nothing must be forced upon him.

The same error stands out still more clearly in giving too large a place to the method of multiple sense perception. Inspired by Comenius, Pestalozzi exalted

“sense perception as the underlying principle of and basis for all instruction and, consequently, attempted to train the child’s capacity for sense perception in a formal and systematized way. The doctrine of sense perception has since made great progress especially due to some of the modern educational theories Small wonder that some have even tried to make it the point of departure in all teaching and education.” (116-117)

If we consider the various subjects in a course of study this Pestalozzian application of the doctrine of sense perception is once for all untenable. Each subject in accordance with its nature demands its own methodology as will be made clear in later discussions.

Method and the Child

In the beginning of this chapter mention was made of two distinct approaches in the choice

of one's methodology. The one, dealing with methods in terms of subject matter, has now been presented; the other, approaching method by way of the very nature of the child, remains to be discussed.

Not only does each child have his own disposition, but his growth from mere immature beginnings to the more mature levels is marked by various stages of development, and methodology must be adjusted accordingly. This then is the problem, now requiring analysis.

"In former times all instruction rested on the two pillars: authority and piety." (120) This implied that the teacher simply distributed the spiritual treasures and the pupil merely received them. The lecturing method loomed large here. The subject matter had first to be memorized and afterwards to be digested through reflection. In addition a rigid discipline, not at all despising corporal punishment, ruled supreme.

Former
methodology

Since the eighteenth century this procedure has been disapproved but has also been condemned unreasonably. "The instruction in former times was in general what it then had to be and could be." (121) It would of course not fit our modern age, but we should never forget that with all its defects it developed strong characters. What can we place over against this with all our modern equipment and modern improvements? Only complaints, disagreement, and revision upon revision.

**Modern
methods**

Especially the "Reform-pedagogues" are found among those still dissatisfied with modern education. The traditional methodology must be entirely scrapped, to be supplanted by a brand new approach, chiefly in regard to the following aspects:

(1) Authority no longer vested in the teacher and no piety on the part of the pupil. Instead, consider the child the centre of the circle and make everything else subservient to his free and independent development. The child has only rights, no duties. He must be roused by his own interest.

(2) Discard that lecturing method; no longer mere acceptance and believing of information, no more memorizing. The child himself must seek, he himself must find, and he himself must evaluate things. Don't advance the question, What ought the child to learn?; rather ask, What agrees with the nature of the child? The child is considered autonomous, with the law of his being within himself.

(3) No longer that discipline which rewards and punishes. Back to nature. Don't use force; don't interfere with growth; at best, merely guide.

"Place the child in a beautiful and attractive environment, in an ideal home, in a hygienic schoolroom adorned with flowers and surrounded by gardens, provide light, air, space, freedom of movement, food, clothing, shoes, medical care, shower baths, and a swimming pool; and every child will grow up as a splendid specimen of human perfection." (124)

* * * * *

It requires little effort to observe elements in this newer pedagogy deserving both apprecia-

tion and support. One can look upon the demands for new methods as a wholesome reaction against the equalizing and leveling down theories of the nineteenth century.

Sympathetic
but sound
attitude
needed

"If the desires of the 'Reform-pedagogues' for changes were simply born out of pity for the hard lot of many neglected children; were limited to a greater emphasis of the teacher's need of a more intimate knowledge of the child and his characteristics; would stress in the instruction more the child's cultural growth and less his intellectual development; would give more room to individual aptitude, to special talent and ability, and to the pupil's own initiative; would establish closer contact between school and life; and would zealously strive for many other improvements in teaching and in education, we should immediately give them our sympathetic support. But the principles basic to 'Reform-pedagogy' must be condemned once for all." (125)

Its three outstanding principles enumerated above will be examined in the following four subdivisions.

Rejection of the Modern Demands; the Problem of Authority

Why should they be condemned?

There is first of all "the fundamental and all controlling question of authority." (125) We are in this matter not so much concerned with moral authority although even this is being undermined by all kinds of views. Moral authority is that superiority one involuntarily ascribes to any expert in a given field. Usually mere circumstances effectively compel the indi-

First reason

Two kinds of
authority

vidual to realize his own ignorance or inability in various matters and to surrender himself to the guidance of such experts. There is, however, also a juridical authority, an authority according to law. It is due anyone who legally occupies a position to guide and rule others. One owes him obedience even though one thinks that much of this guidance is wrong, and that the rule is not always discreet and just.

Origin of
authority:
man or God?

Right here opinions come to a parting of ways. Is there actually such an authority binding us to obedience because it is founded in God's providence; or is the institution of legal authority based on mere human usages and is one therefore justified in refusing to submit? This question cannot simply be solved by science but wholly depends on the attitude of belief or unbelief.

"Whoever believes in God, not necessarily in the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ but merely in general in God, and as a result seriously adjusts his life to this belief, honors God's providential rule and all those relationships in life involving authority, rests on it, continually builds on it, and worships God for the privilege of believing this." (127-128)

There may still be much to improve, but the foundation is secure.

Benefits of
divine
authority

This divinely ordained authority also lends strength to education and instruction. All relationships involving authority which arise especially in the schoolroom "are naturally implied in school life itself and are thereby

proved to rest on the ordinance of God, created in life itself, and further amplified in His Word." (128) Thus God himself invested the teacher with authority and prescribed obedience to the child. This we maintain in spite of our gratitude for what God has given to the child and the high value which Holy Writ ascribes to him. Both parties then have rights and duties because both together are placed under God's authority.

Sense Perception and Subject Matter*

The first error of modern pedagogy, the rejection of authority, is closely followed by a second.

Second reason

"The teacher may force no single truth upon the child; he may not demand that the child believe anything upon authority; the child himself must see all the aspects of a problem and investigate and evaluate them. This position finds its fullest application in the substitution of the socratic method for the lecture method and in placing the sense perception of things prior to the oral communication of words." (129)

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"The argument advanced by modern pedagogy concerning visual perception is entirely sound if applicable to sense perception in general. Not eye perception alone, but multiple sense perception is the startingpoint in all teaching and basic to all knowledge and science." (137)

The need for sense perception

This absolute necessity of multiple sense perception was already admitted by Greek philoso-

* The translators chose "sense perception" as the equivalent for the Dutch word "aanschouwing" which here signifies observation in the broadest sense.

phers and has ever been subscribed to by all Christian theologians and philosophers in the various churches. *Omnis cognitio intellectualis incipit a sensu*. (All intellectual knowledge begins with sense perception.) By way of amplification we should make the following observations:

1. The doctrine of multiple sense perception is opposed to all who assume that the human spirit is capable of acquiring knowledge exclusively through means produced from within (rationalism).

2. It is equally opposed to those who speak of knowledge as identifiable with sense perception only (empiricism and sensualism). Sense perception as such, however imperative, is not yet knowledge; it leads ultimately to knowledge, provided the universal, the essence, the idea, the law, is searched out and understood.

3. The organ of knowledge, therefore, is not sense perception as such but the intellect, which instead of estranging itself from reality constantly penetrates it further.

4. That this human searching after the nature of things is possible, is due to the fact that the subject and object, man and the world, were made by one and the same Logos and are therefore closely related to one another. Reality is rooted in the idea, and the latter is found through thought.

5. In this process of thinking through reality and idea the mind must be furnished with norms.

6. These norms of thought we follow first unconsciously and later consciously, for whatever is revealed to us from without finds response within. "The divine revelation outside

of us presupposes a divine revelation within us." (139)

7. Our perception and knowledge are not only defective but also false and corrupt. "By nature we know not purely nor justly the norms for our intellectual and volitional, our religious and ethical life, and we fall still farther short in adapting that life accordingly." (139)

8. For that reason God revealed us the right norms in His law and in His gospel showed us the way to remove the sad antinomy in our human existence. And, again, from this salient all our relationships to our fellow man can be regulated.

What then is the significance of sense perception for teaching? Each sense organ in its own way contributes to our knowledge of the world about us. There is not the least objection to exercising the various sense organs, though this need not become an intentional procedure.

Significance
of sense
perception

Especially

"the training of the child's eye is already sufficiently done while teaching the regular subjects such as reading, drawing, geometry, etc., and in all instruction that requires visualization of one type or another, because visualized teaching—not merely in the general sense that all instruction should be marked by concreteness, clearness, and liveliness, but also in the special sense that it must be illustrated by objects, models, pictures, maps, charts, etc.—is beyond any doubt entitled to a place in the elementary school." (141)

And yet there is room for the question, What is of more importance in teaching, the eye or the ear, the thing or the word, perception or faith?

If in contemplating an answer one holds fast to the objective viewpoint, discussed earlier in this chapter, that religion is the core subject and that the humanistic studies are grouped around it with physical science as a third group, it is at once clear that the word should be given first place. Especially the humanistic studies are founded on the word and cannot possibly be conceived without it, no matter how advisable it be to use pictures here for illustrative purposes.

Sense Perception and the Child

In trying to solve the problem of priority as between word and thing we can approach the matter not only from the viewpoint of objective value, but also from that of the subject of the teaching, the child. We then ask, What useful information does the child as he develops afford us?

The pre-school period in child life may rightly be called a period of perception, and more particularly a period of eye perception. Then the child amasses material for all subsequent mental activity. And yet it is incorrect to say of this period that the child acquires his impressions exclusively from his own eye perception

“for, in the first place, we should bear in mind that already in this type of perception his mind is actively engaged. Sense perception is not quite so simple, elementary, and passive as is usually assumed. But, secondly, one must remember that the child even in this first period by means of the spoken word and primarily

through his mother's words receives many other and possibly a larger number of impressions, at any rate more important ones than those resulting from simple eye perception." (145)

As clearly as possible and through the use of simple imagery the mother tells of a variety of things, far removed from the immediate environment of her child and beyond his powers of actual perception. Yes, she even tells of an invisible world. "She tells about God and Jesus, about heaven and hell, about angels and the deceased, about relatives and friends" (145) The raw materials for these stories are, it is true, derived from the child's own world of impressions, but their combination is wholly new.

Pre-school
sense
perception

* * * * *

Then follows the school period, and though observation continues to be of value throughout life it is from this stage on no longer the main tool for learning. To be sure, the school must adjust itself to the child's mental equipment, but now the teacher's chief task is so to use the pupil's stock of familiar impressions that he becomes conscious of a new world. Reading, writing, and arithmetic already introduce the child to such a new world of impressions, and language, history, geography and nature study do this all the more. Of course, a great variety of devices for visualization can be used and should be used in all of these studies, "but nobody should therefore conclude that teaching as such takes place through mute objects and charts. In-

Sense
perception
in school

struction must of necessity use the word as vehicle and can only be given by means of the word, for instruction is always communication of ideas, a transfer of impressions from the teacher's consciousness to that of the child." (149)

..... It follows, therefore, that the contention that a child may learn only what he understands is wrong. Especially during the elementary school years his memory grows and reaches its greatest heights. At a later time his reasoning appears, and the memorized material is then the data to be digested, analyzed, organized, and interpreted. This insistence on rote memory in early life, leaving reason to be developed at a later stage was characteristic of the older educational practice; and yet history does not at all indicate that our forebears lagged behind the present generation in reasoning power. And they were our superiors in strength of character and of will, virtues which grew out of an early training in clear and distinct concepts of religion and morality imprinted on the soul of the child.

Our fathers had no scruples whatever against the committing to memory by their children of Bible texts, psalms, Bible history, and the catechism; and if one insists on making experience a criterion, he will find experience showing that nothing affords more strength and comfort than early training in religion.

"If modern pedagogy boldly contradicts this tangible reality, this undeniable *fact*, one involuntarily entertains

the suspicion that back of its opposition to religion and dogma in the elementary school there is something else." (154)

Because it does not want religion, it does not want instruction in religion either. Meanwhile, this hostile attitude, associated as it is with an apprehension of religious instruction, is one of the very best proofs of the fruitfulness of this branch of instruction.

"Therefore, we demand a place of honor in our schools for the Bible, the Christian religion, and dogma." (155) The word dogma need not frighten us, if we but remember that it signifies an objective truth such as every science and every religion has. To be sure, dogma must be presented in comprehensive fashion, vividly, concretely, and, if possible, vitalized with simple imagery. Dogma

"is and remains always the same holy divine truth. That God is, that He is righteous and merciful, that we are sinners deserving punishment, that Jesus came to save sinners—and similar truths are all glorious and holy dogmas." (155)

Let the Bible itself teach us; God Himself there gives us His dogmas through simple stories or otherwise.

Discipline in School

The first fundamental error of modern pedagogy was rejection of authority; the second an exaggeration of the value of sense perception;

The third
reason

we now face the third: its theory concerning discipline.

Implications
of modern
pedagogy

Modern pedagogy insists that schools eliminate the use of force and avoid any form of punishment. Instead, the child must be dealt with in strict harmony with his own nature. Since his nature is good and all evil influences proceed from the environment, punishment and especially corporal punishment, is out of the question.

Difficulties
arising

Meanwhile, the application of this theory gives rise to many difficulties. The abrogation of corporal punishment e. g. caused some increase in youthful lawlessness and then, inconsistently enough, men sought its reinstatement. However, by first undermining authority with new theories and then resorting again to means of force, one does not develop Christian discipline; rather, one thus subverts the very foundations of the right to punish.

The Biblical
view

“Holy Scriptures present a totally different view by placing the rod in the hands of parents and of teachers, who by reason of God’s special ordinance are clothed with authority over children and pupils and therefore sustain a moral relationship to them. Scriptures teach that this rod used discreetly and in love by one who is conscious of the divine order of things will prove necessary and profitable to the pupil.” (158)

Viewed in this light punishment acquires a moral character, its justice is acknowledged, and even the child receiving the punishment can easier bear with it.

In order to add clearness one may compare discipline in family and school life with that in the Church and again with punishment in the State. This last named institution in general punishes not as a pedagogue but as avenger of violated justice. The Church, it is true, has certain necessary rules of order, infringement on which also means punishment, but

Various
institutions
and discipline

"in the inner spiritual economy of the congregation there is no such thing as punishment; here the church knows only of chastisement, for its members are looked upon as children of God whom He loves and therefore in case of waywardness chastises. Family and school discipline, then, is something unique. It is discipline, but it is none the less punishment; yet it is never mere punishment. It has a punitive character inasmuch as it serves to vindicate order, the order of God's law; but it is disciplinary in so far as the transgression punished is a violation not of the public legal order—whose vindication is the business of the State—but of the more private order of the intimate circle of family and school." (159–160)

In other words, we here meet both a moral and a juridical order, so that not only certain violations of home and school regulations, i. e. disobedience, theft, etc., but also moral defects such as wilfulness, sourness, hardheartedness, pride, etc., are punished. The nature and extent of the punishment should accord both with the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

This discipline at home and in school is indispensable. It operates not only negatively in the

removing of evil from the environment but also positively in checking the wrong in the child and in accustoming him to do good. Punishment on the level of mere prudence, so-called natural punishment, cannot satisfy these requirements and is, indeed, in conflict with human nature.

Brief review

The outcome of our investigation regarding methodology in education is that we can list several principles for our guidance.

In terms of selection, organization, and use of subject matter we find the following:

(1) Preserve the organic unity in all subject matter and develop a totality view.

(2) Establish the right correlation between the various studies.

(3) Do justice to the characteristic features of each subject in organizing the material unitarily.

(4) Observe the principle of apperception in a gradual development of the material in each subject and in the proper sequence of the studies.

(5) Differentiate between general methods of teaching for all subjects and specific methods for each.

In terms of the child himself we find that the following considerations are of value:

(1) We must provide careful adaptation to the primary child's world of impressions. (Doctrine of apperception.)

(2) We must try to find the common characteristics of all the children, the special ones of each, and so fit the school to the children as a group and to each as individual.

(3) We must reckon with both the physical and spiritual stages of development in children.

(4) We must try to define the general and more specific purposes for which each child is to be educated.

It is of course much easier merely to enumerate these findings than fully to apply them. It is the task of the curriculum maker to fuse those two aspects of subject matter and child into a harmonious whole.

Concentration: Its Claims

One of the means suggested since many years for retaining unity in education while meeting the plurality of demands is concentration. The doctrine advocates the centralizing of instruction by a process of adaptation around a definite and common core subject. At the present day little can be done with this concept of concentration as many understand and applied it. In an attempt to distill the good features of this doctrine one's attention is drawn to the following points.

In the first place, there should be agreement between home, church, and school. Here the Christian school has a decided advantage, but the neutral public school is, to put it mildly, forced to omit and ignore the religious impressions and concepts which loom so large in child life. Absolute neutrality is an impossibility in practice, and consequently there develops quite readily an antagonistic relation between school and religion;

Concentration
and
institutions

Concent. emp-
hasizes the
unity idea

"and the more hostile the attitude of the so-called neutral school toward religion and Christianity, and toward church and confession the more this school also opposes the home which often—though it be mere custom—honors tradition.

"There is, without doubt, a serious objection to the breaking up of the one public school into as many different schools as church and religion may demand, for in adult life the citizenry, due to greatly varying interests, grows far enough apart as it is. Hence one school for all the children would be a most desirable and useful arrangement." (169)

Yet it is an undeniable fact that there are once for all national differences, not only in social standing but also in religion and confessions. And since the school is compelled to adjust itself to the child's world of ideas, the differences not created by the school but found among the children that enter school should be respected and reckoned with. The problem of concentration though difficult enough for a confessional school becomes still more embarrassing for the public or State school.

Secondly, the studies must be organically, intrinsically related. As was argued before, only Christianity can supply this organic unity inasmuch as it has a central truth.

"This truth is revealed by God and deposited in Holy Writ—a book whose value for education cannot be over-rated, for not only does it acquaint us with the way leading to eternal life but just because it does this it also tells us the way of God for this life..... For that reason, the Bible is not only the book for the church but also the guide for the home and the school, and Bible

Concentration
and studies
as a group

2. All sub-
jects should
be a unity

instruction, provided it be properly given—neither rationalistically nor pietistically but according to its own sense and interpretation—will function as the soul of all instruction and as the organizing force in all education." (171)

A third suggestion is that each study as such should be organized in terms of its own totality, and the teacher should teach each part of it in the light of the whole so that through intensive organization he succeeds in giving perspective to his teaching and in bringing out the distinctive relation between large topics and subdivisions.

Concentration
and each
separate
study

3. Each subject
all the part of it
a larger unit
should constitute
a unity.

"The better the teacher is at home in his field, and the better he sees the organic relation between his subject and others the better he will do justice to the organic unity of the whole and create harmony in the child's world of ideas." (172)

In the fourth place,^{4.} the instruction must appeal to the whole child with all his capacities and abilities. In other words, education being a growth process demands of the teacher to develop in his teaching an organic approach. Though it is true that as far as subject matter is concerned the word of the teacher looms large, and as far as the child is concerned the intellect occupies first place, it must be admitted on the basis of the organic nature of the mind that teaching aiming at intellectual development also trains perception and imagination, memory and recall, reason and conscience. That the faculty of the intellect is organically related

Concentration
and child
growth

also to that of the will is evident, for concomitant with the former is always some degree of feeling or desire, of pleasure or displeasure, of emotion or passion.

“In admitting that instruction is aimed at the intellect it is understood that we have in mind the intellect as centre of the individual who receives the instruction. But it is the centre of the whole man with all his capacities and abilities. There is for us no other entrance to the innermost being of man than through his consciousness; but through this gate we try to reach the hidden recesses of the whole soul.” (173)

For this reason, too, all instruction ought to be accompanied by activity on the part of the pupil. Concentration may rightly demand that every teacher emphasize this, that he urge the pupil to activity, and by so doing keep attention alive.

Two errors should be avoided. There is the notion that each child can develop interest in everything. The manifest erroneousness of this notion has given rise to a second error, that of using the child's spontaneous interest as criterion in determining what subjects he shall be taught. This second doctrine forgets that the child must learn to force his attention to things that are to him wholly uninteresting, because subject matter is more than the child, and obedience is better than sacrifice.

We have so far found and discussed four forms that the concentration of subject matter so frequently urged may reasonably and profit-

ably take. We found the emphasis falling successively on unity of purpose as between institutions (home, school, church), unity in the studies as so many parts of a course of study, unity in the separate organization of each subject, and unity in the mental and spiritual development of the child.

A fifth consideration is really a further application of the fourth. It also deals with the soul life of the child and more particularly with the stages of mental development. And, again, every teacher must reckon with these stages. "Psychology can perform valuable service here, though we should not expect empirical or genetic psychology to present us with entirely new foundations of method." (175) The first stage, according to the view of serial mental development*, is that of sense perception—a period of receptivity. Then follows the second stage with imagination and memory appearing first and with intellect and reason following later. The child now receives the material, digests it, and makes it his own. It is the period of spontaneity. In the third stage the volitional powers assert themselves, and a desire is manifested to use the accumulated knowledge for

Concentration
and the
nature of
mental growth
in children

5. Con-
comitant
view.

* Since Bavinck presents only the serial view and not the concomitant view of development of mental traits, and since Bredeveld fails in his subsequent evaluations to point out this omission, the translators would call the attention of the reader to a discussion of this second view by Thorndike, Dewey, Bonser, Parker (Samuel Chester), Inglis, McDougall, Kirkpatrick, and others. Mere fairness alone demands a comparison of the two views. Moreover, school practice, being influenced all along the line by either one or the other, demands not simply a mentioning of the traditional view but a thorough discussion.—Tr.

productive purposes, to accomplish something. It is the period of activity and productivity.

The teacher must reckon with this development though the periods cannot rigidly be divided. Multiple sense perception is strongly in demand in the first period; the telling or lecture method in the second so that the child may comprehend things; the question and answer method in the third to stimulate the pupil to action. In general, we have three steps: perception, comprehension, and application; or according to the traditional trilogy: *oratio*, *meditatio* and *tentatio*.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DISCUSSION OF "THE METHOD IN EDUCATION"

THE criticism that Bavinck in the chapter on method deals largely with various methods of teaching rather than with method in education, and as a result limits himself more to the narrow aspect of method than to its wider scope, is undoubtedly true. However, in tracing the origin of his *Paedagogische Beginselen* one must remember that the book is the outgrowth of a series of lectures to teachers and hence would naturally stress teaching more than education. Moreover, Bavinck's principal aim was to define his position over against such new tendencies as appeared quite plausible and therefore might readily mould school practice. This was especially true in respect to an almost continuous increase in realistic subject matter, to the generally exclusive emphasis on the heuristic method, and to the ever present demand of adapting the subject matter to the nature and needs of children. And in order to expose these new drifts he simply analyzed the principles from which they ensued and compared them with the principles of Christian pedagogy. In other words, he restated the antithesis between two widely different theories of education,—an

The criticism of a misplaced emphasis on methods of teaching over-ruled

approach readily explaining why the discussion about discipline is practically confined to the right of punishment, and why he purposely omitted a lengthy discussion of those factors and influences bearing on Christian nurture and education. A better and fuller treatment, it is true, would have followed if Bavinck had also included a discussion of methodology intended primarily for the development of Christian character; but its absence is due both to a less systematic treatment and to the circumstance that the theory of pedagogy was not his profession

Summary of
chapter on
"Method"

Bavinck's chapter on "Method in Education" successively deals with method as demanded by the subject matter and as required by child nature; with new tendencies in this field and the objections against them; and with a summary of principles of method and in connection with these principles the problems of concentration. Some of these aspects of method will now be discussed from a somewhat different angle.

Explaining
the gap
between aim
and method

In reading Bavinck, one observes little of the relation between aim and method in education, and one of the causes for this lies in the fact that his definition of the aim of education in spite of its suggestiveness is as such too vague, and that its psychological bearings are not developed with sufficient definiteness. Secondly, only a few conspicuous phases of the whole of education are treated—a circumstance which

should not surprise us too much since we know so little of the actual manner in which the education of the child from immaturity to maturity takes place. The result of this dearth of factual knowledge about the child's actual growth from one stage or level to another, both physically and spiritually, leads inevitably to the situation that in the final analysis we fail to know in how far we really assist approaching the aims and whether we do not often in spite of our good intentions oppose this very aim. It is at once evident that much in the realm of child psychology and its relation to the aim of education needs our attention, and that even a mere summary of the method in education is valuable.

Whatever one's aim in education be, he must of necessity adjust his methods to the levels of soul development from immature beginnings to more mature completeness. Among the many outstanding differences between the initial stages and the adult stages we prefer to select one particular aspect. The world in which the adult lives is of course greater in extensiveness and at the same time more complex and requiring more complex mental reactions than the child's world. But a much more essential distinction for our purposes is the fact that adult life is characterized by a greater fixedness and by less pliability. The adult has acquired various habits and various types of skillfulness, and, especially, there is more unity and organization in his soul life; there are fixed lines of

The mature level of adult education always important for methodology

The adult differs uniquely from the child in two aspects:

richer in
development
but poorer
in learning
new skills

Significance
of unity on
the adult
level

interest; his aims are more definite; in general, his sentiments have been arranged in a kind of hierarchy. But he also has less modifiability so that in his attempt to develop new habits, he meets the opposition of habits already established. So, too, acquisition of new skills is checked by a loss of pliability of the organs; certain interests are irreparably withered; a general sclerosis varying in degree among different individuals has set in. But though modifiability is but lessened and not entirely lost, the capacity passively to let oneself be moulded by others has completely disappeared. As the individual gradually develops the ego-sentiment, as he becomes increasingly conscious of his selfhood with its sense of responsibility and its confidence in its own powers, he inevitably realizes that his "education" not only is never completed, but that it must be more and more a process of self-education. And when he has reached this insight and when outside guidance has become largely impossible, not the specific knowledge nor the particular habits and accomplishments he has previously acquired but the general attitude toward life his earlier training has given him, what sentiment it has taught him to make central,—this is all important.

for subject
matter

What bearing, now, has this increase in fixedness and this decrease in modifiability on the problem of subject matter? Subject matter includes skills and knowledge together with various habits. Now the ideal manner in which sub-

ject matter becomes the child's own is that in which knowledge, skills and habits grow unitarily, as is the case with the child learning his mother-tongue, thereby amassing a large amount of knowledge, skills and habits; and as is illustrated in the manner in which one formerly learned a trade.

Growth a
concomitant
phenomena

But this concomitant growth is not always possible nor necessary. In spite of the organic development of the soul there is also room for the more mechanical and peripheral development of parts—later either to be taken up into the whole or simply to be cast aside. And yet the acquisition of any skill or habit ought to be in response to some desire, ought to find a place in some larger context, even though that be but the general urge to develop a certain type of ability simply for the satisfaction of mastering another skill or establishing another habit. And the more the pedagogue prevents the pupil from acquiring such a new habit or capacity as a merely external addition, abstracted from and hardly fitting into the organism of the pupil's soul life, the better. The one great insistence in contemporary psychology—forgetting for a moment its excrescences—is on just this preservation of psychical unity, more particularly in opposition to the unpedagogical tendency constantly to increase the amount of subject matter.

The place
and purpose
of mechanical
learning

The ideal is
always
organic unity

In discussing the selection of subject matter Bavinck is led by what he calls two opposing

Choosing
subject
matter and
Bavinck's
two principles

Rather than
being oppos-
ing principles
they are com-
plementary as
is clear from
practice

and from
theory

principles: the one criterion being the intrinsic value of the subject matter and the other the capacities, interests and desires of the child. The former he labels the objective standard and the latter the subjective one, claiming that the objective viewpoint is the right one and allowing the subjective one to be applied in certain instances involving subordinate questions of organization and use of the subject matter. However, this contrast is never asserted with such sharpness, not even by extremists. In the selection of subject matter, no one will ever consider only the desires of the child; he will rather by means of these very desires teach that which he deems of value to the child. Likewise, no one can ever succeed in bringing subject matter to the child when no points of contact with the child's interests exist, no matter how important he himself thinks the particular subject matter to be.

Moreover, the antithesis itself does not in reality exist. We cannot truthfully say that on the one hand we have valuable subject matter, and that on the other hand we must yet find out whether the child is interested in it. Whatever is truly valuable is by that same token in profoundest harmony with man's nature. Even Bavinck himself again and again points this out,—in showing, for example, how religious instruction is indeed in accord with the nature of the child.

But what prompted Bavinck in making this

antithesis? He was afraid of mere utilitarianism and of the tendency to teach the child various things both good and useful which were merely adapted to the child's capacity and desire. He feared that with such a procedure the all important principal contention that the objective truth, placed higher than man, has value in itself and that it is to be assimilated by the child, whether directly useful or useless, whether pleasant or unpleasant, would be crowded out by the plurality of mere accomplishments.

Explaining
Bavinck's
reasons for
this antithesis,

"Truth, to be sure, is intended *for* man, but not *according to* man and neither *because of* man; man exists much rather because of the truth in order that he might know it and in that way become free." (108)

One can be wholly in accord with the general intention of this quotation without accepting Bavinck's antithesis between the two principles of selecting subject matter; a careful reading of the quotation itself clearly shows the fallacy of such a contrast. A re-reading of his whole discussion in this matter reveals a confusing of three lines of approach; viz., the ideal value of certain subject matter in contrast with the utility value of it in actual practice, the objective value of subject matter as such over against the child's interests and desires, and the content value of subject matter in distinction from its so called formal discipline value. It is possible in these three aspects to observe an objective

and revealing
the fallacy of
it

element versus a subjective factor, but it is better to analyze each approach separately.

The first line
of argument:
ideal value
versus utility
value

In the first line of approach Bavinck contrasts the Christian life view and Humanism with Realism. Knowledge of the ancients is quite interesting, it is argued by some, but what value has it for us today? Bavinck attacks this sort of reasoning. The soul is more than the body, and the spirit is more than matter. First of all we ought to do justice to religion, then provide for those subjects that centre about language, and finally take care of the physical sciences.

Evaluation of
this approach
by a totality
view of man

What shall we say of this? It is of fundamental importance to consider one's starting-point in determining the aim of education. Whoever views man in the totality of his relations is capable of arriving at the proper appreciation and differentiation. The result will be that a Christian cannot but view the relation of man and God as central—a relation which education ought most of all to take to heart, also in determining the subject matter. Meanwhile one ought not to forget certain considerations. In the first place, "living well" presupposes "living" so that, ignoring for the time being the question as to which things really are useful, one cannot realize "ideal" values without "utility" values. Besides, the ideal subject matter attains ideal values only on condition that it not only be merely "learned" but also actually "lived". And for the same reason no one need exaggerate this ideal value, for the practical results will suffi-

ciently disillusion him. Whoever expels religion at once expels that part of the ideal which as yet had the greatest chance to take root inasmuch as it is part and parcel of man's innermost being. In the third place, mathematics and the natural sciences in themselves have no less ideal value than the humanities have, if one only takes the trouble of viewing them in their broad relationships. In themselves both groups of studies are one-sided. Technical schools are beset with dangers even as the gymnasia were formerly from an opposite side.

Three arguments for a totality view of ideal and utility values

We may therefore conclude that subject matter in terms of utility values should prepare the child for the complex milieu of his later life, and that in terms of ideal values it should establish in the child definite contacts with a wider and higher world, enabling him insofar as possible to live in it. That we often meet disappointment in our attempt at creating these values is a well known fact. There is much that does not reach beyond mere memorization and sheer reproduction. The important question is how to get the child started spiritually. Of course, the matter of disposition in the child is a basic one, to be discussed in connection with the second line of argument.

Purpose of both kinds of values

The antithesis between the objective value of subject matter and the capacity, interests, and desires of the child is not warranted if we insist on viewing the former as objective and the latter as subjective. Whatever has objective

Objective value versus child's interests

Eliminating
this anti-
thesis by
pointing out
their mutual
adaptability

value has value for some subject. It does not follow that therefore truth depends on man. Man is made so that he can assimilate the truth, and only as he assimilates it can the truth become truth for him. The objective can be appropriated and can receive form only by the road of the subjective.

The outstand-
ing problem
is that of
individual
differences

The basic problem here is much rather that of individual differences in the appropriation of truth by the subject, and although in practice often a question of prejudices, it is primarily a mere question of facts. Take for instance the matter of religious instruction for the child. If it were true that this instruction were wholly unfit for the child, we should, on Bavinck's basis, have to insist on such instruction in the very face of the impossibility of achieving any results, just because of the supreme worth of religion. But the actual fact is, as Bavinck himself on occasion contends, that provided this instruction be properly given, it is fit for the child and appropriate to his nature. Only prejudice would attempt to gainsay this fact.

Harmonious
growth
possible

If, then, one succeeds in correctly stating the aim of education, such subject matter as is in harmony with that aim must, generally speaking, of necessity be fit for the child and adapted to his desires and interests. Our specific problem here is carefully to adjust subject matter to stage of development without ignoring the problem of individual differences. Aside from prejudices that fail to establish a sense of pro-

portion between the objective value of subject matter and the child's interests, all investigations that throw light on the nature of subjective appropriation of the objective, and that help fill the gap between the subjective and objective so that each approaches the other, can be of profit.

The distinction in the third line of approach is well known and very important but again is not simply a contrast between the objective and the subjective. Formal discipline value is ascribed to different subjects in various degrees in the sense that through their study skillfulness or good habits are developed; the study of geometry, for instance, is valuable also for those who in the future will never have any occasion for using geometry; and the value consists in the advantages derived from training in differentiation, generalization, association, logical thinking, etc. Other subjects by contrast have more content value inasmuch as they give the pupil such information as is both necessary and profitable for his spiritual or material well-being.

Material
value versus
formal
discipline
value

Nature of
formal
values

But, the formal discipline value as such is not sufficient. Suppose we could equip an American with all the abilities of observation, comparison, thinking, etc., by teaching him the Japanese language, literature, and history—yet we would reject the opportunity for with such a procedure the American would assimilate a content probably never needed by him and taking

and their
limitations

Need for
content
values

the place of a content much needed. One should not only provide the child with formal values but should also give him content that has value for him. And Bavinck, as was noted, emphasizes the value of religious instruction just because it imparts a content that is valuable in itself. Now the differentiation between formal discipline value and content value is of importance, and the value of religious instruction is indeed insurpassable; but we must remember that whatever has objective value in itself can acquire real value in education only if it be assimilated by the individual. Man must know the truth that the truth may make him free.

The ultimate
oneness of
the two kinds
of values,

and its import
for education

The distinction between formative and material development is after all bound up with the psychical attitudes of the pupil. A content objective but which remains floating somewhere unattachedly above the pupil, is no content for him; a content can never be a mass safely deposited in some compartment of the mind, it must of necessity grow into the very fibres of the soul. And such assimilation of content cannot take place without moulding the individual, without "forming" him.

The two
kinds are
mutually
dependent

If one does receive formal training, for instance in skillful thinking, he must of necessity think about a certain problem, and in doing so will become familiar with that problem. He receives something of general value and general applicability, but he acquires his general skill by beginning with specific cases. Sound econo-

my in teaching demands that thinking be developed with subject matter not only valuable for its formal discipline but also for practical use. In arithmetic, for instance, we should select problems from real life and in that way make formal training serve the content of the subject matter.

Their oneness
and school
economy

Not only is formal training unthinkable without material or content value, but the reverse is equally impossible. The content cannot be mastered by the individual without formative influences on the individual. The truth of this is clear first of all because no content can be acquired, no skills developed, and no habits established without mental activity. But there is more. In considering formal values we usually think of skills and habits, but the content values of subject matter, ideally considered, largely consist of the concomitant development of sentiments or mind sets or inner urges,—in a word in something formal. Instruction in the history of one's country, for example, can assist in the nurturing of the sentiment of patriotism—a general formative influence not identifiable with knowledge of dates and names but of a much higher order. Many people, indeed, must admit that they have forgotten much of the detail of the subjects they once studied; yet the fact that they have once studied these subjects, that they have once lived into these subjects, makes their present attitudes and reactions and their whole outlook different from what it would

Their oneness
further
illustrated

Content
values and
concomitant
formal values

have been without this earlier instruction. Knowledge has no value unless it has related us to higher or lower realities. Or to state it in other words, the content of subject matter has not become actual content for the child unless it is part of the very fibre of his soul structure and has lastingly influenced it.

A distinction
of importance

What we are accustomed to label formative value does not provide the highest nurture; what we call content can actually contribute to the highest development. From this angle Bavinck, fully aware of the influence on the child exerted by the subject matter, is justified in calling attention as he does to its objective value.

He indeed was not at all ignorant of a fact to which one of his critics calls his attention, "that instruction as such is far from being education and that through mere memorization of the Catechism and Bible quotations no 'men of God', no 'perfect men of God' are being made." But he also knew that the instruction in our Christian schools was more than memorization, and that often through this type of instruction an influence was exerted on the soul that changed mere awareness of meaning to an understanding, and that changed learning to living.

A curriculum
problem

It is of practical importance to know which parts of the subject matter should be transformed into mere skills and as such should stress mechanical drill not without appealing to the activity sentiments; and which parts should

contribute in providing contacts with a lower or a higher world of realities—to which we are bound—and consequently add to the nurturing of sentiments of a personal nature and those concerning external realities.

Intimate knowledge of the structure of the subject matter and of its relation to the child's soul will help us better to solve the various problems in the field of methodology which have in recent years been multiplied, and which have given rise to many new tendencies.

The method

We already noted Bavinck's lack of wholehearted sympathy towards the new approach in methods. His partiality for the telling method in which the teacher explains and the pupil listens is very evident. The least departure from it he relates to the question of authority and summarily condemns. And, indeed, if all that these newer methods attempt is the outgrowth of "a revolutionary rejection of divine ordinance" then all of it is to be rejected as fruit from a bad tree; but then, too, it is surprising how Bavinck can still recognize good elements.

Fairness
needed

It is equally strange how, for instance, he strongly protests against the principle of "making the child the norm in teaching" and yet subsequently points out how religious instruction is precisely in harmony with the child's real nature and therefore, according to that same norm, good.

Reflecting on these seeming inconsistencies one cannot at times escape the conclusion that

Danger of
using extreme
illustrations

Bavinck in his criticism has in mind only the most extreme and most clamorous theories, which as soon as they are put into practice prove their utter impracticability, as is illustrated in a school advocated by Tolstoï where each pupil might do as he pleased, and where not the child of reality but a hypothetical and imaginary one is the norm. The real child wants guidance.

Investigation
and discovery

But even a wrong movement, as Bavinck might have recognized more explicitly, originates in some aspect of reality; and however onesidedly and erroneously it may interpret that aspect of reality still does us the service of calling attention to it. And it is then our business independently to investigate that aspect and in the process to utilize everything that other investigations, including those of our opponents, have brought to light.

An ever-
recurring,
important
question

Now it would seem—waiving for the moment the wrong principle and the extreme positions—that the new movements under discussion have raised a most important question: How shall we bring about more harmony between our methods and the nature and needs of the child? Which is the most effective way for the child to assimilate the truth as presented by the teacher? What is “the way the child should go”? This question is not only permissible but obligatory, and to answer it we must have recourse to both experience and experiment. One ought to be grateful for what has been done in this direction, and the applicability of certain theories will

always serve as a proper test to determine which of the preconceived notions and opinions about the child are invalid.

For instance, if it prove true, as William James argued about 1890, that the child's life reveals certain "impressionable periods" particularly fit to assimilate specific subject matter, we should, if practicable, gratefully use this discovery. Again, if it be true that a certain psychic or mental "set" is necessary for each individual's labor then, if possible, we should reckon with it. Likewise, if it be proven that the library approach encourages the desire for study, we want to use that approach. And so on.

Authority and Method

Now all these concessions can readily be made without impugning the authority of the teacher and obedience on the part of the pupil. We can without reserve subscribe to Bavinck's protest against the undermining of divinely appointed authority, also as regards relations in school, but that does not solve the question of method. And so we may grant that the second basic error of modern pedagogy as criticized by Bavinck—"the child should believe nothing merely on authority"—is actually defended by many and by some crudely applied for reasons of self-gratification even though no practical school man could ever fully embody it in his teaching; but here we meet extremes which soon prove their own absurdity, and meanwhile we

Dangers do
not exempt
from duties

have not answered the question how to plan our teaching so as not merely to satisfy but actually to utilize that spontaneous urge and native initiative in children towards maximal development.

The duty of
examining
our own
methods

Whoever compares the way in which the child in early life obtains an immense wealth of ideas and skills with the method used in drilling him for an examination cannot suppress the query: Is there no other way? If we prove that in reaching the educational ideal no other way is possible, we simply must abide by it. Meanwhile, however, we must continue investigating.

The principle
of authority
does not
exclude pupil
activity;

Moreover, maintaining the principle of authority does not imply that *every* truth is to be forced upon the child, that he believe *everything* purely on authority, and that he may *never* attempt to see things for himself, to investigate and to evaluate them. As a matter of fact, pupils and teachers are both in the same situation when facing God's revelation in nature, history, and Scripture. It does not take so very long, for example, for a pupil to reach the stage where he will detect the teacher's mistakes in arithmetic. After all, in how far the teacher shall impart knowledge or have the pupil find it is merely a question of teaching technique. There is once for all a large amount of knowledge that can be given to the pupil by no other way than that of oral communication. Neglecting this truth one is liable to become the victim of an exaggerated notion of exclusive

pupil activity. Again, it makes very little difference whether we label the child's own investigations self-activity or a modified form of a teacher's way of imparting knowledge. There being no principle involved, the only practical consideration is whether the child is active and responsive for without himself being active the pupil will never assimilate knowledge. Experience including the outcomes of experimental psychology can best determine which method is most profitable.*

The problem may never be disposed of by a rigid attitude that everything the child is to accept must first have his approval through self-seeing, self-investigation, and self-evaluation. It isn't even possible to apply this exclusive position throughout; and no matter how much we encourage self-initiative, self-expression, and self-development, every pupil again and again will accept the truth merely because "teacher says so."

It is precisely when we come in contact with things themselves that we clearly realize our dependence on other men. If I know next to nothing about chemistry, I may entertain the opinion that in order to acquire knowledge about this subject I merely need to buy a few chemicals in a drug store and mix them and

nor does self-activity on the part of the pupil exclude authority

* The translators are of the opinion that the problem of pupil activity needs even more consideration than Brederveld gives it. He is discussing merely the positive aspects of how children learn while assimilating knowledge, but the negative aspects of self-correction, self-restraint, and self-inhibition together with the truth that after all children educate themselves surely open a wonderful perspective regarding the problem of pupil activity.—Tr.

heat them; however, no sooner do I put this theory to the test, but I realize the need of expert guidance. Whoever in any field of knowledge advances to the stage where he actually investigates, realizing that the field is much too extensive for any single individual, continually feels the need of instruction. The truth of this is especially evident in our age of highly specialized education.

But, the reader may ask, What relevance has all this material? Does not Bavinck himself admit that the nature of the child should help to determine method?

The point is that in our discussion of method we should state the case fairly. Bavinck may, for example, prefer the telling or lecturing method to the socratic, but if so it will have to be on the ground that both subject matter and child nature demand it, even as he himself argues, and not on the ground that there are some who, rejecting authority, conclude that the child must be permitted to search out everything for himself. This causal relationship between a certain method of teaching and the rejection of authority does not exist here. Bavinck distinguishes moral and juridical authority; but the teacher's authority in regard to subject matter is moral; and so it is simply a question of tactics whether the teacher shall exercise his moral authority through the telling method on the part of himself, or through self activity on the part of the pupil.

Bavinck's suggestions in defence of the word in teaching are of great importance. The "word" and multiple sense perception always go hand in hand. The "word" without multiple sense perception is not a word but remains a mere sound; and sense perception is a function which especially after the first instinctive period of the child's life is in a very large degree dependent on the "word". One observes only that which draws one's attention. One must learn to observe and know what is worthwhile observing and here the "word" functions. Without the "word" there can be no development of concepts nor of imagination. Without the "word" there is no world of spiritual realities.

The "word" vitalizes teaching;

Now vocal sounds will not become words, and sensation will not become perception without active participation of the human spirit. Opinions may differ as to whether in this process the telling method is the most suitable, or whether its value is relative to the age of the child, his stage of development, and the subject matter. In so far as there is an attempt in our times in various ways to stimulate the child to activity, we ought to be grateful for it. And we need not fear that in the process the "word" will lose value; rather, insisting on child activity is like preparing the soil for the word-seed. Meanwhile, we can quite safely await further experimental investigations of pedagogical facts.

and pupil-activity does the same

Finally, we face the question of having the children memorize what they do not compre-

hend. Bavinck rightly defends this practice but in my opinion uses arguments which if taken literally are not very auspicious. His reasoning is as follows: "Let the child's memory in his early life be stored with facts; at a later time reasoning will appear and digest this mass of information. Our fathers followed this policy, and they certainly did excell in strength of character and keenness of judgment." The first argument is rather hazardous for it is quite unreasonable to expect that a child learning one hundred dates at the age of ten will comprehensively systematize and understand them at the age of fifteen. The second argument loses its edge if we remember that the superiority of our fathers is unquestionably due also to the circumstance that they faced actual life at an earlier age and much more so than we do. Moreover, Bavinck in this same connection ascribes the origin of these virtues to an early training in *clear* and *distinct* ideas of religion and morality. This, it is evident, is quite different from mere memorizing without comprehension. Bavinck, it must not be forgotten, is speaking of the memorizing of material which has absolutely no significance for the learner at the time of memorizing.

Memorizing
of non-
comprehended
material
justifiable

It may be granted that memorizing of sentences without comprehension is perfectly in accord with the children's natural development. They hear adults speak of various matters and often understand very little of the meaning.

They often repeat whole sentences that are beyond their mental grasp. But all this does not alter the fact that very soon through repeated use of the words in connection with things designated they get the meaning of many of the words, so that within a very short time they have enough ability in the case of many sentences to know what these are about.

Further, words heard previously they hear again and again, and as a result their hold upon their significance improves after so much repetition. In other words, the child never memorizes something which he does not at the time understand to retain it unchanged for a couple of years; the human mind is not a series of separate compartments.

Applied to the memorizing of texts and songs, this means that one should avoid what is purely senseless to the child and should begin with material that is to some extent, even though it be slight, within his reach or can be brought within his reach by very elementary interpretation. Building on this primary work and rigidly using the law of apperception, we lead the child to higher levels. The element of repetition in this procedure will prove one of the best means for the child's giving ever more content to what he learns. Realizing this, the teacher will never insist on mere accumulation of facts which are to receive meaning at some indeterminate future date. At one time the pupil will learn of things whose names he does not know;

The teacher's
duty all-
important

then again, he will hear words whose meaning is yet vague to him; but at all times the teacher will aim at establishing relationship between those two and will never forget that mere "words", whose significance is unknown, are very treacherous; they bring great danger of inflation.

Discipline in School

In turning to Bavinck's discussion of discipline, we should remember that here again his aim is in no wise to view the problem in its totality but is primarily to warn against a tendency which would reject both compulsion and punishment in education. He defends the right of punishment as well as its educative or disciplinary character.

In treating of family and school discipline he stresses its twofold aspect; viz., as discipline and as punishment with this further distinction that the one always appears concomitantly with the other. In order to avoid all quibbling we do well to ask whether definite and concrete cases can actually possess this dual character of punishment and discipline.

The immediate
purpose of
punishment

Punishment is a means for maintaining order within certain groups and is according to divine injunction necessary for these groups. If one rightfully punishes, no matter where, he is under compulsion to inflict the punishment. He may not neglect his duty. Neither has he as keeper of the law, to be concerned about the results.

The punishment may indeed realize many consequences, but from the standpoint of punishment itself these are all extrinsic and accidental. From this it follows that punishment viewed entirely as punishment is wholly separate from education.

At the same time, punishment as an act does exert an influence on the person involved just as any other experience in life would exert some influence. A sickness or an accident may contribute to one's moral training ; and so an act consisting of a punishment and primarily intended to be such may be considered in respect to its incidental concomitants. In this way the fact that punishment has inevitable consequences helps to make social life within a certain circle, including home and school, possible. It contributes its share in bringing about outwardly irreproachable conduct and in preventing the outcropping of evil intentions—the characteristics of punishment. At the same time it influences both reason and conscience—the characteristic of discipline. It impresses upon him that there is a public law which has to be maintained, but it also checks violent impulses and may lead back to the realization that the transgression of the law was the expression of an evil disposition.

Some
inevitable
ultimate
results

In a variety of ways, then, the act meant as punishment may incidentally co-operate in accomplishing just that which is the general purpose of discipline; viz., a strengthening of good

intentions and the trained ability to realize them and a repressing of evil desires. And it is precisely the task of the educator, whose constant purpose should be moral nurture, so to use, to direct, and to interpret the punishment that it never embitter the individual but attempt to improve him. Moreover, it should likewise be the aim of the educator to apply disciplinary means so that he may prevent transgressions and in so doing make punishment superfluous.

From this it is quite evident that the manifestation of a wrong intention (as in the case of such jealousy that does not offend others) cannot be met by punishment. One may contend that in such a case the justice of God is violated, and indeed discipline must condemn the act as wrong. But the punishment for this sin as sin against God is beyond man's jurisdiction, except in cases indicated by God Himself, where maintaining order in a specific sphere of life simply makes punishment an absolute necessity.

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At the close of my summaries and evaluations I face the question whether I have sufficiently brought out the good and the beautiful in Bavinck's pedagogy. But, immediately, I cherish the hope that especially through the writing of this brochure I may stimulate to a more intensive study of Bavinck's work. And then the outstanding and often unparalleled beauty will surely appear. Not mere laudation, not mere

casual reading, but earnest reflection of Bavinck's book on pedagogy will benefit us. I tried to do this in my own way, and hope that others will follow to do it in their way. Then Bavinck's contributions to Christian pedagogy will accomplish their purpose.

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